Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
1989

National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in International Arbitration
William W. Park
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the Dispute
Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International
Arbitration , in 63 Tulane Law Review 647 (1989).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1615

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

NATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL JUSTICE:
SAFEGUARDING PROCEDURAL INTEGRITY IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
WILLIAM W. PARK*

INTRODUCTION ..................................... 648

I.

A.
B.
C.
D.
II.

..........
Local ProceduralSafeguards ..................
National Supportfor the Arbitral Process.......
The Counterpoise of Rules and Fairness........
The Nationality of Awards .....................

THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL NORMS

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NEUTRALITY OF

FORUM ............................................

667

A.

667
668
670

The Arbitrator'sBind ..........................
1. The "Second Look" .......................
2. Lex Mercatoria ............................
B. MaintainingArbitral Integrity: The Side Effects
. of Enforcing PrivateDispute Resolution ........

III. THE
A.
B.

IV.

650
651
656
659
663

674
679
The Role of the Arbitral Seat .................. 679
"Delocalization"fromTwo Perspectives ........ 684
1. Grounds for Review: The Perspective of
the Arbitral Seat ........................... 685
2. Effect of Annulled Awards: The Perspective of the Enforcement Forum ............ 686
INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY OF AWARDS ....

TRENDS IN NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW ........

689

A. Resisting Arbitral Anarchy: The French
M odel .........................................
B. Excluding JudicialReview by Contract.........
C. Going All the Way in Belgium .................
D. Switzerland's Hybrid System ...................
E. Striking a Balance .............................

690
693
694
695
697

* Professor of Law, Boston University. Adjunct Professor of International Law, The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. B.A., Yale University; J.D., Columbia University;
M.A., Cambridge University. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Dijon. Visiting
Professor of Law, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva).
Thanks are due to Gabriel Aubert, Kathy Biberstein, Betsy Hafner, Ron Goodman,
Franziska Helm, Bill Kaleva, Greg Klein, Philippe Neyroud, Dan Partan, Michael
Reisman, Adam Samuel, Monique Vuagnat, and Tony Weir.

647

TULANE LAW REVIEW

648
V.

[Vol. 63

SUBJECT MATTER ARBITRABILITY AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF AWARDS ...............................

699

A. Protecting the Public .......................... 700
B. Justifying InternationalCommercial
Arbitration..................................... 701
C. DistinguishingDomestic and International
Transactions................................... 703
CONCLUSION ............................ ........... 705

"I gave them statutes that were not good, and laws they could
not live by."
Ezekiel 20:25
INTRODUCTION

The law chosen to govern the merits of an international
contract dispute does not always lead to results that satisfy an
arbitrator's personal sense of what is right. The arbitrator therefore may be tempted to resolve the dispute according to his own
notion of justice. Seduced away from the rules of the otherwise
applicable law, the arbitrator may take on unauthorized powers
of amiable composition.' While most international arbitrators
1. Amiable composition is a term of varied and not altogether precise meaning, used in
continental legal systems to refer to the power to decide a dispute without reference to any
fixed system of law. An arbitrator exercising such power is sometimes said to be deciding
ex aequo et bono, although it is not clear how congruent the Latin and French expressions
really are. Parties who authorize the arbitrator to act as an amiable compositeur may be
deemed to have waived the right to challenge the award. On amiable composition, see J.
LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 510-12 (1978);
J.ROBERT & T. CARBONNEAU, THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION § 6.02 (1983). See
generally E. LOQUIN, L'AMIABLE CoMPosrON EN DROIT COMPARt ET
INTERNATIONAL (1980).

The French Nouveau Code de procddure civile, article 1474, describes amiable
composition by contrasting it with rules of law: "L'arbitre tranche le litige conformment
aux r~gles de droit, i moins que, dans la convention d'arbitrage, les parties ne lui aient
confer6 mission de statuer comme amiable compositeur." [The arbitrator decides
according to rules of law unless authorized by the arbitration clause to decide as amiable
compositeur.] CODE DE PROCADURE CIVILE [C. PR. CIV.] art. 1474 (Fr.) (All translations
are by the author unless otherwise noted.).
Although the amiable compositeur may dispense with rules of law, his power is not
without limits. He is not a mediator, and may not modify the terms of the contract. Nor
may he ignore substantive or procedural norms of public policy (ordrepublic). See M. DE
BOISSfsON, DRorr FRANqAIS DE L'ARBITRAGE §§ 354-377 (1983); Jarvin, The Sources
and Limits of an Arbitrator'sPowers, 2 ARB. INT'L 140 (1986).
Article 13(4) of the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce
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are conscientious in respecting the bounds of their mission, some
have been known to boast of their skill in finding ways to bypass
the established rules of the party-chosen law. To circumvent the
prescribed limits of their authority, they have discerned "emerging trends" that lead in a contrary direction, or invented new
principles of trade usage and lex mercatoria.2
When an arbitration implicates foreigners, the judiciary of
the arbitral seat might not examine the award according to the
same standards applied to domestic controversies. Recent legislation in major European arbitral centers has curtailed the
power of local courts to set aside awards in international arbitration. Belgium has gone so far as to eliminate any right to have
an award set aside, even for such defects as arbitrator fraud and
excess of authority, unless at least one party is Belgian. 3 Swit-

zerland has enacted a statute that permits contractual exclusion
of any and all court challenges to awards when all parties are
non-Swiss.4
Practitioners and policymakers alike can appreciate the
international arbitrator's desire for freedom from constraints of
substantive and procedural national law. One can also understand the winner's desire not to see a challenge to an award in its
favor. However, the arbitration affects not only winners, but
(1986) [hereinafter I.C.C. Rules of Arbitration] provides for the arbitrator to assume the

power of amiable composition only if the parties agree.
2. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. See generally W. CRAIG, W. PARK
& J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION ch. 35 (1984);

INTERNATIONAL

CHAMBER

OF COMMERCE, PUB.

No. 440/1,

L'APPORT DE

LA

JURISPRUDENCE ARBITRALE (1986); Cremades & Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoriaand the
Harmonization of the Laws of InternationalCommercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J.
317 (1984); Fouchard, Les Usages, l'Arbitre et le Juge, in LE DROIT DES RELATIONS
ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES---ETUDES

OFFERTES A BERTHOLD GOLDMAN

67

(1982) [hereinafter ETUDES GOLDMAN]; Goldman, Frontiresdu droit et lex mercatoria,
1964 ARCHIVES DU PHILOSOPHIE Du DROrr 177; Goldman, L'arbitrage,les conflits de lois
et la lex mercatoria, in L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 103-50 (1984);

Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law-The Lex Mercatoria, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

113 (J. Lew ed. 1987)

[hereinafter Goldman, Applicable Law]; Lagarde, Approche Critique de la Lex Mercatoria
in ETUDES GOLDMAN, supra, at 125; Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International

Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747 (1985); Mustill, The New Lex
Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR LORD WILBERFORCE

149 (1987); Note, General Principlesof Law in InternationalCommercialArbitration, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1988).

3. Law of March 27, 1985 (Belg.), relating to the Annulment of Arbitral Awards,
added a new subparagraph to article 1717 of the Belgian Code judiciare; see infra note 162.
See generally Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound in Belgium, 2 ARB. INT'L 68, 68-69 (1986).
4. Loi FEDERALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV [L.D.I.P.] art. 192 (Switz.)
(text of 18 Dec. 1987); see infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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also losers, and often society at large as well. The fashions for
non-national justice and arbitral autonomy, if pushed too far,
will ultimately backfire to compromise the integrity of international dispute resolution. The chemistry of these trends may
inflict on the business community an unjust uncertainty even less
appealing than the mandatory norms of local arbitration law.
The interests at stake include not only those of the parties,
but also the rights of persons who may never have consented to
arbitration at all. Under a system of complete arbitral autonomy, such as now prevails with respect to foreigners in Belgium,
the victim of arbitrator fraud or other procedural irregularity
would have no opportunity to challenge the arbitrator's decision
where rendered. Such a "loser" would be required to defend
against enforcement in every country in which it had substantial
assets. When the victim of procedural irregularities is the losing
claimant, the results of arbitral autonomy are even more dramatically unfair. If denied the opportunity to have the award set
aside where rendered, the unsuccessful claimant has no enforcement forum in which to contest the defective award, for the simple reason that there is nothing to enforce. The losing claimant's
only recourse would be to commence litigation and to deny the
award's res judicata effect-a solution hardly compatible with
the bargain to resolve disputes through arbitration rather than
the courts.
The following remarks will suggest that the arbitral situs
bears a duty to provide the loser of an arbitration with a nonwaivable right to challenge an award for an arbitrator's disregard either of his mission or of fundamental due process in the
proceedings. This obligation springs from the active and passive
support that the country of the proceedings gives to the arbitration. Elimination of any and all grounds for challenge of awards
is an intriguing but misguided experiment, likely to do more
harm than good to fair and efficient international dispute
resolution.
I. THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL NORMS
Today one hears much cheerful talk about justice done
through autonomous arbitrators deciding under "delocalized"
procedure, free from the procedural safeguards traditionally
imposed by those national legal systems that support the arbitral
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process.5 Liberating international arbitration from constraints
of national legal systems implicates several themes. One theme
relates to choice of law. Arbitrators may decline to apply the
strict letter of a specific national law to the merits of the dispute,
and may interject into their decisions elements of trade usage.6
A second element in the trend toward greater arbitral
autonomy relates to enforcement of the arbitration agreement.
Increasingly, courts have permitted arbitration of sensitive
public law issues, such as antitrust, securities regulation, or
claims against a bankrupt, that were traditionally deemed nonarbitrable.7
Yet a third theme of modern arbitration law, explored
below, is that procedure should be "delocalized," in the sense of
being free from mandatory norms of the arbitral situs.8 Some of
these norms constitute procedural safeguards against arbitrator
misconduct.
A.

Local ProceduralSafeguards

Many European arbitral centers have attempted to increase
their shares of the fees accruing to local lawyers and arbitrators
by enacting reforms. These reforms free arbitrators from fear of
judicial second-guessing through direct or indirect appeal of
5. On delocalized arbitration, see J. LEw, supra note 1, at 285-347; A. VAN DEN
BERG, THE NEw YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 28-51 (1981); Goldman, Les Conflits de Lois dans l'Arbitre
Internationalde Droit Privd, [1963] II RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADf-MIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE [RECUEIL DES COuRs] 347; Lalive, Les Regles de Conflit de
Lois Appliqudes au Fond du Litige par L'Arbitre InternationalSidgeant en Suisse, 1976
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 155; Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: An Award
Detachedfrom the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358 (1981);
Paulsson, Arbitre et juge en Suede: Exposi gdndrale et reflexions sur la delocalisation des
sentences arbitrales, 1980 REV. ARB. 476; Paulsson, Delocalization of International
CommercialArbitration,32 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 53 (1983) [hereinafter cited by its popular
title as Paulsson, Wings of Silence]. But see Mann, England Rejects "Delocalized"
Contracts and Arbitration, 33 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 193 (1984).
6. See I.C.C. Rules of Arbitration art. 13(5) (1984), which provides that "[i]n all
cases the arbitrator shall take account of the provisions of the contract and the relevant
trade usages." Scholars such as Professor Berthold Goldman of the University of Paris
have suggested that an arbitration agreement implies a choice of at least part of the new lex
mercatoria. Goldman, La Lex Mercatoria dans les Contrats d'Arbitrage International
Rdalitis et Perspectives, 1979 J. DROIT INT'L 475, 481-87.
7. See generally Park, PrivateAdjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding
Scope of InternationalArbitration,12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 629 (1986) [hereinafter Park,
PrivateAdjudicators].
8. See, e.g., Paulsson, Wings of Silence, supra note 5.
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their legal conclusions.9 The rationale for these changes is that
businessmen who opt for arbitration prefer speed and finality
over the legal precision arguably obtained from appeal. Judicial
review on the merits of awards may make arbitration merely a
rehearsal for court litigation. 10
Such delocalized arbitration would seem to promote the
wishes of the parties without necessarily violating the vital interests of the arbitral seat. In a transnational dispute, the arbitration usually will have its economic or social impact outside the
borders of the place of the proceedings. Only if local substantive
law applies to the merits of the dispute will detachment from the
law of the place of the arbitration affect the country of the proceedings, and then only tangentially by removing from judges
some disputes that otherwise might have fertilized the local law's
evolution.
The trend toward delocalization, however, has gone beyond
merely taking from judges the power to hear appeals on substantive legal issues. As already mentioned, Belgium has abolished
any right to annulment of awards in arbitration between foreigners, even, it would seem, for arbitrator corruption.II Switzerland
has given foreign parties the option to contract out of any judicial review. 2
A transnational adjudicatory system, completely detached
from national judicial control at the arbitral seat, arguably permits the arbitrator to pursue a more perfect justice by ignoring
otherwise applicable rules of law that the arbitrator finds inconvenient in the case at hand. The winner is likely to approve of
the speed, finality, and economy resulting from such arbitral
justice.
But what of the loser? Will the pursuit of justice, in disregard of applicable law, deny the parties' shared expectations?
What of society? Will disregard of law affect the enforce9. When, in 1979, England enacted legislation to limit judicial review of arbitration
awards rendered in London, Lord Cullen of Asbom offered an estimate (perhaps

exaggerated) that this reform would bring England 500 million pounds of "invisible
exports" such as arbitrators' and lawyers' fees. 392 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 99 (1978);
see Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English
Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 87, 96 & n.49 (1980) [hereinafter Park,

JudicialSupervision].
10. On the English experience with merits appeal, see Park, Judicial Supervision,
supra note 9, at 91-96.

11. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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ment of statutes designed to protect public as well as private
interests?
What of the health of arbitration as an adjudicatory system,
when dissatisfied contenders perceive the process as
untrustworthy?
The dark side of delocalized arbitration is that arbitrators
will find it easier to exceed their powers in jurisdictions that provide no control over the arbitration's procedural fairness. The
loser in a defective arbitration (for example, a corporation
improperly joined to the arbitration merely because of its relationship to the defendant) will not be able to litigate the arbitrator's excess of authority at the time the award is rendered.
Instead, the loser will have to raise the matter in every country
in which its assets are at risk in the execution of the award.
When the victim of procedural irregularities is the losing claimant, the results of the arbitral autonomy are even more dramatically unfair. If denied the opportunity to have the award set
aside where rendered, the unsuccessful claimant has no enforcement forum in which to contest the defective award, for the simple reason that there is nothing to enforce. Its only remedy will
lie with litigation, which may be inconsistent with the agreement
to arbitrate.
All arbitrators must fill gaps in the agreements they are
asked to interpret. Arbitrators may be empowered to fill gaps
either by the parties themselves, or by the properly applicable
law. 13 Trade usage inevitably plays a role in contract interpretation. 14 But filling gaps by reference to a best guess about the
parties' intent is not the same as filling gaps according to the
arbitrator's private sense of the correct outcome. When properly applicable legal rules indicate the result of a dispute, justice
apart from law denies the parties' shared expectations and opens
an avenue to discredit the arbitral process. Indeed, a case might
be made for judicial review, to insure that the arbitrators have
not rewritten the contract or ignored imperative norms of international public policy, 15 even when the parties have authorized
13. See generally Nicklisch, Agreement to Arbitrate to Fill Contractual Gaps, 5 J.
INT'L ARB.,

Sept. 1988, at 35; Verveniotis, Arbitration and ContractualGaps, 5 J. INT'L

ARB., Sept. 1988, at 103.

14. See I.C.C. Rules of Arbitration art. 13(5) (1984).
15. For an administrative law analogy, see Davis, No Law to Apply, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1 (1988), arguing that the United States Supreme Court should not have denied
review in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), merely because there was "no law to
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the arbitrator to dispense16 with the application of law and to act
as amiable compositeur.
The variety of choice of law clauses found in international
contracts makes it difficult to generalize about the limits of arbitral autonomy. Sometimes parties provide for a specific national
legal system to govern their obligations, which trade usage and
mandatory norms of the place of performance may or may not
supplement. Occasionally the contract provides nothing, leaving
the arbitrators free to select a governing law according to their
views of appropriate conflicts rules. 17 Some arbitrators are
explicitly given power to dispense with the law and to act as an
amiables compositeurs, or to apply a non-national "law
merchant," or lex mercatoria.
In all these variants of the choice of law process, the arbitral situs traditionally has provided some measure of control
over the basic procedural integrity of the process. 18 Respect for
the parties' chosen law is protected by giving the loser the right
to challenge the award for arbitrator excess of authority, a concept present in most legal systems under different names.19
The desirable extent of control has been the subject of spirited interchanges. The great intellectual protagonists have
included Professor Berthold Goldman, who argues that all
investigation of the nature of international arbitration "leads to
the ineluctable necessity of a system that is autonomous, not
national. ' 2 0 In the opposite corner of the ring, Dr. Francis
apply." Davis argues for review to insure "justice, fairness and reasonableness." Davis,
supra, at 11.
16. See, eg., C. PR. civ. art. 1482 (Fr.) (providing that the award is not subject to
appeal when the arbitral tribunal has been given the mission to decide as amiables
compositeurs unless the parties expressly reserve the right of appeal). See generally M. DE

BOISSPSON, supra note 1, at §§ 440-443.
17. See I.C.C. Rules of Arbitration art. 13(3). On choice of law in arbitration, see
generally Derains, L"Application Cumulative par L'Arbitre des Syste'mes de Conflit de Lois

Intdressds au Litige, 1972 REv. ARB. 99.
18. See Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration, 32
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21 (1983). The seminal analysis of the role of these mandatory
territorial procedural norms was presented over 20 years ago by F.A. Mann in Lex Facit

Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LiBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE
(1967) (Dr. Mann's classic work was recently reprinted in 2 ARB. INT'L 241 (1986)); see
also Hirsch, The Place of Arbitration and the Lex Arbitri, 34 ARB. J. 43 (1979).
19. Provisions for judicial review of arbitrator excess of authority may be express,
e.g., France and the United States, or implied, e.g., England ("arbitrator misconduct" in
section 23 of the 1950 Arbitration Act) and Switzerland (the award's incompatibility with
public policy, L.D.I.P. art. 190 (2)(e) (Switz.)).
20. Goldman, supra note 5, at 379-80 ("A moins de s'en tenir A la r6ference
rationnellement injustifiable au syst~me de rattachement du si6ge arbitral . . . toute
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Mann has maintained that "it is in the highest interest of the
State... to maintain the principle of judicial review of arbitration not only to develop the law, but also to ensure the administration of justice and thus to avoid the risk of arbitrariness. "21
Seeming to moderate the debate, Professor Arthur von Mehren
has suggested that arbitrations are subject to national law only
to the extent that public authorities intervene in connection with
the conduct of the arbitration or the enforcement of the award.22
National intervention often occurs when courts are asked to
enforce an award, or when the loser attacks the validity of an
award at the place of the proceedings. 3 At issue are not just the
grounds for challenging awards, but also the timing and the
geography of judicial review-the when and the where of court
intervention.
Few disagree that review should be available in the jurisdiction in which the award is enforced. There is less consensus,
however, on whether review should also be available at the place
of arbitration when the award is rendered.
In most arbitral centers, national law provides for challenge
to awards rendered locally even if no local citizens or residents
are involved. Modem arbitration statutes exclude, or permit
exclusion of, review of the merits of a dispute, while granting a
right of review to insure procedural fairness. This required
review extends to matters such as the proper constitution of the
arbitral tribunal, the arbitrator's respect for the terms of his mission, and the absence of corruption. 24
Some grounds for review are fairly subjective and have
engendered considerable controversy. In the United States,
recherche d'un syst~me de rattachement . . . d6bouche sur l'in6luctable n6cessit6 d'un

syst~me autonome, et non national").
21. Mann, PrivateArbitration and Public Policy, 4 Civ. JuST. Q. 257, 267 (1985); see

also Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM
FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157, 159 (1967) ("every arbitration is subject to a specific system of
national law").
22. von Mehren, To What Extent Is CommercialArbitrationAutonomous, in ETUDES
GOLDMAN,

supra note 2, at 217, 222.

23. For a comprehensive analysis of the heteroclite varieties of challenge to arbitral
awards before national courts, see Craig, The Uses and Abuses ofAppealfrom International
Arbitration Awards, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD ch. 14 (1987).
24. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). For convenience, one
might summarize the grounds for vacatur as (i) excess of authority and (ii) lack of due
process. Violating public policy would be an additional ground to deny confirmation. See
9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) (permitting refusal of confirmation for one of the grounds under the

New York Arbitration Convention for denial of recognition); Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l
Mktg., S.A., 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 261 (1987).
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dicta in one Supreme Court case suggests that federal courts can
vacate awards for a type of excess of authority labelled "manifest
disregard of law."' 25 In England, an award may be set aside for
arbitrator "misconduct."2 6 French judges can annul awards that
27
violate international public policy (ordrepublic international).
In Switzerland, under cantonal procedure, an award can be
annulled for a "clear violation of law or equity. 2 8 After the new
Swiss federal law goes into effect, awards may be annulled for
violation of public policy (ordre public) unless both parties are
non-Swiss and have expressly waived any right to judicial
challenge.29
B. NationalSupportfor the Arbitral Process
Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution in which a pri30
vate agreement invests the decisionmaker with his authority.
Transnational commercial arbitration in most cases justifies
itself principally
as a means to achieve a non-national neutral
forum. 31
National law, however, gives arbitration its legally binding
character. Courts become actors in arbitration when business
managers ask that arbitration agreements and awards be
enforced against recalcitrant parties, that assets be attached,32
25. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). Drawing on section 10(d) of the
Federal Arbitration Act, the Court said vacatur of an award might be allowed when "the
arbitrators exceed[ed] their powers." 17d.at 436 n.22 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(d)). See cases
cited in Park,.PrivateAdjudicators,supra note 7, at 660 n. 105; see also Northrop, 811 F.2d
at 1269; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir.
1986).
26. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, § 23. The meaning of "misconduct" is
uncertain. At one time the term was interpreted to include "procedural errors and
omissions by arbitrators who may otherwise be doing their best to uphold the highest
standards." COMMERCIAL COURT COMMITTEE, REPORT ON ARBITRATION, 1978 CMND.
No. 7284, at 17, para. 67. A recent decision by Mr. Justice Steyn may have limited its
scope. See Bank Mellat v. G.A.A. Development Constr. Co., [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 44
(Q.B.) (majority arbitrators refuse to convene further meeting at request of dissent).
27. C. PR. CIV. art. 1502(5).

28. See Concordat Suisse Sur l'Arbitrage, art. 36(f), discussed in Neyroud & Park,
Predestination and Swiss Arbitration Law: Geneva's Application of the Intercantonal
Concordat, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (1983).
29. See L.D.I.P. arts. 190(2)(e) & 192 (Switz.), discussed infra notes 166-70 and
accompanying text.
30. See R. DAVID, ARBITRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 9 (1982).
31. In some cases, arbitration may be justified by the arbitrator's expertise. For
example, London frequently is chosen for arbitrating insurance and maritime disputes
arising out of standard form contracts subject to English law, because of the local
arbitrator's experience in these matters.
32. See cases cited infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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that the scope of the arbitration clause be determined,33 or that
poorly drafted (sometimes pathological) arbitration clauses be
made workable. 4 The authority of an arbitrator, therefore,
derives not only from the consent of the parties, but also from
the several legal systems that support the arbitral process: the
law that enforces the agreement to arbitrate, the forum called on
to recognize and enforce the award, and the law of the place of
the proceedings.
The practical importance of this last legal system, often
referred to as the law of the arbitral seat, derives from the
scheme of the New York Arbitration Convention.35 Under that
scheme, the arbitral seat gives the award an international currency merely by letting the award be rendered within its territory.36 The place of the proceedings provides support to the
arbitral process by allowing an award to take on a presumptive
validity under the New York Convention. That validity facilitates enforcement against assets found in jurisdictions that
adhere to the Convention.37
The arbitral situs may also provide active support to arbitration conducted within its frontiers. Assistance may take the
form of enforcing the agreement to arbitrate, compelling production of documents, or granting attachment of assets ultimately
used to secure payment of the award.
This power to enhance the effectiveness of arbitration
within national borders imposes a responsibility of judicial control over the integrity of the arbitral process that receives
national support. An arbitrator's binding decision has worldwide legal consequences for all the parties to the dispute. It
would seem anomalous that the country in which this decision is
33. See, e.g., S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190,
193-95 (2d Cir. 1984) (fraud in the inducement); Overseas Union Ins., Ltd. v. AA Mutual
Int'l Ins. Co., [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 63, 66-70 (meaning of "all disputes and differences" in

arbitration clause).
34. For example, the arbitration clause may not provide for the way arbitrators will
be appointed, or may be ambiguous on the question of whether the parties have actually
renounced recourse to courts. See Eisemann, La Clause d'Arbitrage Pathologique, in
ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL 129 (1974); Scalbert & Marville, Les Clauses Compromissoires
Pathologiques, 1988 REv. ARB. 117.
35. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter the New
York Convention].
36. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
37. New York Convention, supranote 35, art. III; 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). The United
States reservation to the New York Convention limits the Convention's application to those
awards made in another contracting state. See infra note 122 and acompanying text.
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made should exempt it from any judicial review, even for gross
procedural defects such as arbitrator fraud or lack of a valid
arbitration agreement. Without some judicial recourse, the loser
in such a clearly defective arbitration must defend against
enforcement of the award everywhere in the world in which the
loser has assets, perhaps having to prove several times over that
it never signed the arbitration clause or that the arbitrator took a
bribe. If the loser in a defective arbitration is the claimant, the
arbitral process may offer no recourse at all.38
On the other hand, an award annulled under the law of the
country inwhich it was rendered will usually be refused recognition and enforcement abroad. 39 Enforcement of an annulled
award is rare in practice 4° and is mandated by treaty only if the
parties are covered by the 1961 European Convention. 4 ' In the
United States, conflicts of law principles might even compel res
judicata effect for the issues decided by a foreign judgment
annulling an award.42
The winner's interest in speed, finality, privacy, and economy must at some point yield to the loser's concern for a fair
proceeding. The viability of transnational arbitration requires
that the national legal systems that make arbitration binding
also insure its integrity. Otherwise the trend toward transnational norms and "justice without law" 43 may injure the parties
as well as the legitimate public interest that law is designed to
protect.' The business community's resulting loss of confidence
in the arbitration process would not be surprising.
38. See supra Introduction at 649.
39. New York Convention, supra note 35, art. V(1)(e): "Recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is
invoked, [if] ...the award... has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."
40. But for a French case suggesting recognition may be granted to an award
annulled where rendered, see Norsolor v. Pabalk, Judgment of Oct. 9, 1984, Cass. civ. Ire,
Fr., 10 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 101, discussed infra note 87.
41. The 1961 European Convention on International Arbitration, April 21, 1961, 484
U.N.T.S. 349, 374 [hereinafter 1961 Geneva Convention]. This only applies to disputes
between nationals of different contracting states. Id. art. 9.
42. See infra notes 139-41; see also R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW § 76 (4th ed. 1982); Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign
Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IowA L. REV. 53, 53-61 (1984).
43. See J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 109-14 (1983) (presenting a critique

of the role of law in arbitration).
44. See discussion of "arbitrability" of subject matter, infra Part V; see also DOMKE
ON

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION:

THE

LAW

AND

PRACTICE

OF

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION §§ 8.01, 8.05, 8.06, 12.00-12.02 & 13.00 (G. Wilner ed. 1984); Park, Private
Adjudicators, supra note 7, at 635-40.
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C. The Counterpoise of Rules and Fairness45
Business decisionmakers contemplating a proposed transborder sale, loan, or acquisition will want to know how potential
disputes will be adjudicated. Seeking a neutral forum, they may
agree that future controversies will be settled by arbitration.
These managers may also seek greater certainty by inserting into
the contract a choice of law clause, providing for resolution of
disputes according to the laws of a particular jurisdiction known
for its developed legal system. For example, English law frequently is chosen to govern international insurance and maritime agreements. 4
Admittedly, too much fuss can sometimes be made about
the role of legal certainty in business choices. In the real world,
business managers and their lawyers often compromise on a governing law without a great deal of research on how the chosen
legal system will affect the outcome in the spectrum of possible
controversies. Discussion of future disputes when signing the
contract often seems a bit like planning for divorce at a wedding
feast.
Yet lack of reasonable certainty regarding the applicable
norms will not usually enhance cross-border commerce, finance,
or investment. While some deals may be consummated without
regard to applicable law, others will not. In many contexts, multinational business enterprises will insist on calculating and balancing legal risks in making choices about their alternative
commercial opportunities.
A banker may extend credit on the basis of his borrower's
reputation and balance sheet. The lender will nevertheless want
to know that the loan agreement, as well as any security agreement or third party guarantee, will be enforced under the applicable law.
Neither the banker nor the customer is likely to authorize
that disputes be resolved under a shade tree, according to an
45. Implicit in my view of the legal process is an assumption that words are not
infinitely plastic, and that authoritative community values articulated in statute and case
law of Western legal systems do constrain adjudicatory outcomes, even if not always
perfectly. For a contrasting view on the intriguing question of whether legal rules are ever
"determinate" enough to bind an adjudicator, see Singer, The Player and the Cards:
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25 (1984). For a radical linguistic
exploration of uncertainty in the written word, see J. DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE

(1967).
46. See I DICEY & Moms ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 549-51 (L. Collins 11th ed.

1987).
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adjudicator's intuitive sense of fairness or momentary impulse,
but will likely prefer the stability offered by a choice of national
legal rules to govern the merits of any dispute.4 7
By opting for binding arbitration, international business
managers are indicating that they desire procedures simpler than
those of a national court. But unless arbitrators are authorized
to act as amiables compositeurs, these businessmen are not opting for abandonment of legal rules. On occasion the chosen law
itself may incorporate
nebulous terms such as "fair play" or
"good faith."' 48 But this is a different matter from an arbitrator
excusing performance of contractual obligations, or awarding an
indemnity, merely because the performance appears onerous or
the indemnity appropriate notwithstanding the applicable law.49
The essence of binding arbitration is that by contract parties
to a dispute select their own private judges and procedures.
Implicit in this agreement to avoid national courts is the
assumption that arbitrators will follow the minimum requirements of a fair hearing, including respect for the party-chosen
law.
It is always open to the contracting parties to agree to settle
their controversy according to other models, such as nonbinding
mediation (which often precedes rather than replaces litigation)
or a "split the difference" compromise imposed by an authorized
third party.50 These models, however, are not the rule in trans47. See generallyVagts, Dispute Resolution Mechanism in InternationalBusiness, 203
RECUEIL DES COURs (Hague Academy)

19 (1987)

(citing M. WEBER, GENERAL

ECONOMIC HISTORY 277 (F. Knight trans. 1966)).
48. For example, in the emerging case law on lender liability, the banker may be held
to an ill-defined standard of "fair play." See cases cited in Johnson & Gaffney, Lender
Liability: Perspectives on Risk and Prevention, 105 BANKING L.J. 325 (1988). And under

the Uniform Commercial Code, commercial contracts may be subject.to an obligation of
"good faith performance." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987). See generally Gillette, Limitations on
the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619 (1988).
49. There may be a particular temptation to excuse nonperformance because of

dramatic market fluctuations in long-term contracts for the supply of natural resources.
See generally W. PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (1986); Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to
Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1985); Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 2005 (1987); Speidel, Court
Imposed PriceAdjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 369

(1981).
50. See, e.g., CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK XIV, THE BOOK OF JUDGES 66-67

(Hershman trans., Yale Judaica Series 1949), in which Maimonides equates arbitration and
compromise:
It is commendable at the outset of a trial to inquire of the litigants whether
they desire adjudication according to law or settlement by arbitration. If they
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border business dispute resolution.
On occasion, even arbitrators not acting as mediators or
empowered to decide as amiables compositeurs may be tempted
to abandon the rules of law in favor of the more fluid principles
of fairness.51 The arbitrators' motivation seems to be that ad hoe
justice, according to their sense of fairness rather than according
to legal rules, permits finer distinctions to suit the peculiarities of
a specific case.52
Wide variations exist in concepts of fairness. Like the
notion of justice, fairness is usually encrusted with emotional
and philosophic overtones. The authoritative adjudicatory process that comprises what we call law includes enforceable rules
of conduct that the community recognizes as binding. These
rules convey information to decisionmakers about community
goals, norms, and values.
Legal rules are not necessarily unfair or inequitable, but
they sometimes lead to a result other than what the observer
feels to be appropriate to a particular case. When juxtaposed to
legal rules, fairness approaches that which in continental legal
systems would be called 6quiti. Fairness reaches toward general
notions of "right" that may be in tension with the dictates of the
state, and appeals to commands of morality or ethics beyond
those expressed in court decisions and statutes.
prefer arbitration, their wish is granted. A court that always resorts to arbitration
is praiseworthy. Concerning such a court it is said: Execute the justice of...
peace in your gates (Zech. 8:16). What is the kind of justice which carries peace
with it? Undoubtedly, it is arbitration. So too, with reference to David it is said:
And David executedjustice and charity unto all his people (II Sam. 8:15). What is

the kind ofjustice which carries charity with it? Undoubtedly, it is arbitration,
Le., compromise.
On mediation, see generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESoLU-

TION 7-11, 91-147, 189-225 (1985); see also L. KANOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE REsOLUTION 39-111 (1986); S. LEESON & B. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN AMERICA 133-62 (1988).
51. One might add religious thinkers, some of whom have argued that even God's
own laws are unjust. See R. WURMBRAND, SERMONS IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 16
(1969): "No law can be righteous, even if it is divine, because every law fixes equal
standards for men of unequal abilities, who are put in unequal situations." Wunnbrand
complains that the commandment "Honor your father and your mother" is given to those
whose fathers are good men as well as to those whose fathers beat them unjustly. "Thou
shalt not commit adultery" is said to a man who has a loving wife as well as to one whose
spouse is unbearable.
52. See, eg., L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 63-65 (1968); D. LLOYD, THE
IDEA OF LAW 124-25 (1964); see also H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 153-63 (1961). On

the concept of "equity" in public international law, see M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-66

(1988).

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

To the extent that commercial law lags behind standards
shared by the business community, arbitration according to fairness rather than legal rules may occasionally promote the parties' expectations. However, these cases will be at the margins,
rather than the normal experience, unless there is some reason to
assume that lawmakers are not doing their job well, or at least as
well as arbitrators.
Moreover, law is part of a larger community process that
may seek to limit business notions of acceptable behavior, for
example, with respect to treatment of employees or tenants.
No one opts for an unfair result applied to himself. However, it is rarely possible to predict in advance of the dispute who
will get the rough side of the law, since the contours of the controversy do not exist. For this reason, parties to commercial
transactions agree to "play by the rules," aware that application
of the rules will not always produce agreeable results. It is not
irrational to assume that businessmen desire the application of
rules of law as an accepted calculus of justice, even though those
rules lead to consequences that could be described as unfair.
The slim objective content of fairness makes the concept
inherently chameleon-like. In contrast to the Chancellor's equitable remedies in fourteenth-century England, transnational
commercial fairness cannot be given coherent substance before
any central adjudicatory authority. Businessmen who see fairness the same way in the abstract may diverge in its concrete
application to commercial controversies, illustrating Emerson's
53
observation that "one man's justice is another's injustice.
Decisions that ignore legal rules are unlikely to provide the
predictability that business managers seek in planning strategy,
evaluating risks, and making commercial choices. Nor is dispute resolution according to nonlegal criteria likely to be any
more successful than legal rules in bringing community standards to bear on the allocation of values and resources that affect
third parties.54
53. Emerson, Circles, reprintedin ESSAYS 214 (Spencer Press ed. 1936).
Harold Berman has noted the dangers in the current use of the terms "fairness" and
"justice." He writes: "What is to prevent discretionary justice from being an instrument of
repression and even a pretext for barbarism and brutality, as it became in Nazi Germany?"
H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 40-41 (1983); cf Park, Legal Issues in the Third
World's Economic Development, 61 B.U. L. REv. 1321, 1330-32 (1981) (suggesting that
"equity" may become an excuse for opportunistic programs of "he takes who can").
54. On the relatonship of the transnational legal process to the distribution of "the
things people want," see Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S.
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The losing party in an arbitration in which rules are ignored
may have less of a feeling that similar cases have been treated in
a similar manner than when the decisions are made according to
legal rules. Decisions according to "fairness" and "dquitd"
rather than rules may appear as an excuse for results that are
arbitrary and capricious.
The tendency (both in arbitration and in jurisprudence) to
retreat from decisionmaking constrained by rules calls to mind
the 1935 National Socialist legislation in Germany, which permitted judges to punish violations of "sound popular instinct"gesundes Volksempfinden." This empty expression permitted a
de facto reversal of the principle nulle poena sine lege, and
allowed courts to reflect the Fiihrer's will, setting an extreme
example of adjudication without rules.
In short, whatever its benefits to a particular case, in meeting the needs of cross-border business and protecting public
interests, ad hoc justice is unlikely in the long run to be any
more satisfying than decisions according to legal rules.
D. The Nationality of Awards
During the quarter century since talk of "a-national" arbitration has made its way from Professor Goldman's Hague lectures to the more common conversation of international lawyers,
the "nationality of awards" has been the subject of unnecessary
mystification. Much of the confusion in characterizing awards
and arbitrations has come from a tendency to apply labels without regard to their context.
The New York Arbitration Convention covers awards characterized as either "foreign" or "non-domestic." Foreign
awards are those rendered outside the enforcement forum. Nondomestic awards may be rendered locally, but are nevertheless
covered by the Convention because they involve transactions
CALIF. L. REv. 362, 388-90 (1971). See generally W.M. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER,
JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 1-20 (1987).

55. See Law of 28 June 1935: Gesetz zur Anderung des Strafgesetzbuches, published
5 July 1935, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 1 No. 70, at 213 (W. Ger.). Article I, section 2,
provides punishment for "anyone who commits an act.., which deserves punishment
under the basic philosophy of a criminal statute and sound popular instinct": "Bestraft
wird, wer eine Tat begeht, die das Gesetz ffir stratbar erklhrt oder die nach dem

Grundgedanken eines Strafgesetzes und nach gesundem Volksempfinden bestrafung
verdient." See H. SCHORN, DER RICHTER IM DRITTEN REICH 62-76 (1959); H. SCHORN,
DIE GESETZGEBUNG DES NATIONALSOZIALISMUS ALS MITTEL DER MACHTPOLITIK 9-84

(1963).
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and/or parties that are almost or entirely foreign.56
Foreign arbitration overlaps international arbitration- 7
The latter deals with disputes having an international element,
and may be delocalized procedurally within the limits of
national arbitration law. In countries such as Belgium, England,
France, and Switzerland, statutes either limit or permit the parties to restrict judicial review of awards that implicate international commerce. 58 But such awards are neither foreign nor
non-national. They are usually subject to national statutory
rules concerning vacatur and confirmation, even if related to an
international dispute. An award may be nondomestic for purposes of the New York Convention, and yet subject to national
procedures for confirmation because it was rendered locally.
The terms "a-national" and "stateless" have been used
loosely to describe those awards that, for a variety of reasons,
are not subject to review under any national law except that of
the place in which the award is ultimately presented for enforcement. This characterization might be applied to include awards
refused registration in courts of the place where rendered, 59 and
awards made in places like Belgium that provide no review of
56. See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650, 652-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff'd, 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983). A dispute arose out of a charter party between a
Norwegian ship owner and a Swiss company for transporting chemicals between the
United States, Europe, and the Caribbean. An award in favor of the ship owner, Bergesen,
was denied enforcement in Switzerland. On Bergesen's petition for confirmation in the
United States, the district court held that the New York Convention applied to an
arbitration agreement between two foreign parties, even though the award was granted in
the United States. Id.
57. See generally Delaume, What Is an International Contract? An American and
Gallic Dilemma, 28 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 258 (1979); Fouchard, Quand un Arbitrage est-il
International?, 1970 REv. ARB. 59; Rubino-Sammartano, International and Foreign
Arbitration, 5 J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1988, at 85.
58. See CODE JUDICIARE art.

1717 (Belg.), infra note 162; England's 1979

Arbitration Act, discussed in Park, JudicialSupervision, supra note 9, passim (exclusion of
appeal is not possible, however, for insurance, commodities, and maritime disputes
governed by English law); France's 1981 Arbitration Decree, discussed in Craig, Park &
Paulsson, French Codification of a Legal Framework for International Commercial
Arbitration: The Decree of May 12, 1981, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 727 (1981)

[hereinafter Craig, Park & Paulsson, French Codification]; on the new Swiss arbitration
statute, see discussion of L.D.I.P. arts. 190(2)(e) & 192 (Switz.), infra notes 166-70.
59. See Delaume, SEEE v. Yugoslavia: Epitaph or Interlude?, 42 J. INT'L ARB. 25
(1987); see also Paulsson, The Extent of Independence of Arbitrationfrom the Law of the
Situs, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at

141. Another speaker in the Eason-Weinmann Colloquium has written that "a-national
arbitration neither exists nor is needed." Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. Rnv.
631, 633 (1988).
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arbitrations between foreigners. 60 Awards under the aegis of the
World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 61 might also be characterized as anational. Sui generis public law arbitration under treaty, such as
the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, is a problematic category.62
Commentators and judges are divided over whether socalled stateless awards are enforceable under the New York
Convention. The leading scholar on the Convention takes the
view that they are not, based on his reading of the Convention's
explicit scope in conjunction with its provision relating to
defenses to enforcement of awards.63
The thirty-year saga of Socidtd Europdenne d'Etudes et
d'Entreprisesv. Yugoslavia (S.E.E.E.) offers a spectacular example of the divergence of opinion on stateless awards. 6" An award
rendered in Switzerland on July 2, 1956, disposed of claims arising out of an agreement to build a railroad in Yugoslavia before
60. One commentator objects to this characterization on the grounds that parties
might elect Belgian procedure. See Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound in Belgium, supra note
3, at 73. For another reason the label may be imperfect, see infra note 164.
61. Convention on the Settlement of -Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, T.I.A.S. No.
6090. On arbitration of "state contracts" in general, and ICSID arbitration in particular,
see B. AUDIT, L'ARBITRAGE TRANsNATIONAL ET LES CONTRATS D'ETAT (Hague

Academy of International Law 1987) (Nijhoff 1988).
62. See Dallal v. Bank Mellat, 1 All E.R. 239 (1986) (recognizing a U.S.-Iran Claims
Tribunal award presented for enforcement in England even if not covered by the New York
Convention because not considered as Dutch); see also Gould v. Iran, No. CV87-03673 RG
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1988) (order denying motion to dismiss), IRAN ASSET LIT. REP., Jan.
29, 1988, at 15313. Gould involves an attempt to enforce in California a U.S.-Iran Claims
Tribunal award in favor of the Iranian Defense Ministry. The court denied the motion to
dismiss the Iranian petition for enforcement merely because the award might not be subject
to Dutch review procedures.
Awards rendered by the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal are systematically registered by
the Dutch courts in The Hague to further their enforceability. However, there is no
certainty that the awards are subject to challenge in Dutch courts. A special bill proposed
in 1983 would have given Dutch courts jurisdiction over the Claims Tribunal awards, but
this bill has never become law.
63. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 5, at 34-43; see also van den Berg, NonDomestic ArbitralAwards Under the 1958 New York Convention, 2 ARB. INT'L 191 (1986).
Van den Berg focuses on articles V(1)(a), (d) & (e) of the New York Convention,
permitting enforcement of an award to be refused if:
(a) The ... agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or... the law of the country where the award was made;... (d) The
composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with.., the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award.., has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
64. See Delaume, supra note 59.
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World War 1I. The award was' filed, but refused registration, in
the Cantonal Court of Vaud, the place where rendered. Registration was refused because the arbitral tribunal did not include
an uneven number of arbitrators, as required by Vaud law. The
award was ultimately denied recognition in the Netherlands,
apparently on the grounds of its statelessness. 65 Later, however,
the award was granted recognition in France, notwithstanding
that it fell "beyond the judicial sovereignty" of the place where
rendered.66
Awards such as S.E.E.E. that have merely been refused
court registration under the law of the situs are sometimes confused with awards that have been explicitly vacated where rendered. An annulled award is anything but stateless. Indeed,
annulment proves the award's link with the place where ren67
dered, as recognized under New York Convention article V.
The term "a-national arbitration" has also been applied to
arbitration in which the arbitrators decide the merits of the dispute without reference to a fixed national system of law, a practice prohibited in some arbitral centers. 68 The arbitrator may
65. See Decision of the Hoge Raad, Nov. 7, 1975, translated in 5 G. GAIA,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION-NEW YORK CONVENTION pt. 35, at 2
(1978). This was the second time around in the Hoge Raad, the first decision of 1973
having been based on Dutch public policy and a settlement between France and
Yugoslavia.
66. See Judgment of Nov. 13, 1984, Cour d'Appel, Rouen, 24 I.L.M. 345 (1985);
Judgment of Nov. 18, 1986, Cass. Civ. Ire, Fr., 114 J. DR. INT'L (CLuNET) 120 (1987), 26
I.L.M. 373 (1986).
67. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
68. English law has traditionally imposed on the arbitrator a duty to apply a fixed
recognizable system of law. See M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

594-96 (1982). Awards rendered by arbitrators deciding as amiables compositeurs or
applying lex mercatoria therefore have been of uncertain validity in England.
In March of 1987, the Court of Appeal cast doubt on this rule in the case of Deutsche
Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft v. Ras Al Khaimah Nat'l Oil Co., [1987] 2 All E.R.
769 [hereinafter DST v. RAKOIL]. An I.C.C. arbitration in Geneva arose from an oil
exploration contract in the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah. As permitted by I.C.C. Rule
13(3), the arbitrators selected the applicable law in the absence of choice by the parties. An
award in favor of DST was rendered July 4, 1980, based on "internationally accepted
principles of law governing contract relations," an abridged reference to lex mercatoria.
The Court of Appeal, in an opinion by the Master of the Rolls, Sir John Donaldson, held
that it was not contrary to English public policy to enforce the award even though not
based on any national legal system. The RAKOIL case must be approached with great
care, since the arbitration procedure was governed by Swiss law. An inference that English
courts have abandoned their opposition to lex mercatoria and amiable composition in
London arbitration would be speculation. See generallyHunter, Publication ofAwards and
Lex Mercatoria, 54 ARB. 55, 57-58, 67 (1988); Mulcahy, Ex Aequo et Bono, 54 ARB. 105
(1988).
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decide according to trade usage and lex mercatoria,69 may take
on powers of amiable composition,7" or may apply "general principles of law."' 7 ' Such arbitration is more likely to occur, and is
more justified, when it is difficult for the arbitrator to ascertain
the exact content of the otherwise applicable law.
For clarity in analysis, it is important to describe what an anational arbitration is not. The term would be misapplied to an
award deemed nondomestic under the New York Convention if
subject to local judicial review, as in the Bergesen case. 72 Nor
would it be appropriate to apply the term to an award that is
unenforceable because of the sovereign immunity of the loser, as
in the Swiss stage of the LIAMCO saga.7 ' Such arbitrations are
international but not stateless, since they are subject to judicial
confirmation or annulment where rendered.
II.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NEUTRALITY OF FORUM

A.

The Arbitrator'sBind

To urge that arbitration should be subject to local procedural norms is not to be unsympathetic to the plight those norms
may create for the arbitrator. In a transnational dispute the
arbitrator dealing with sensitive public law issues must look over
his shoulder at national constraints imposed by the seat of the
arbitration, the place of contract performance, and the situs of
the loser's assets. Not only must he be attentive to more than
one legal system, but he must also juggle dictates that are not
always consistent.
69. On lex mercatoria,see infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
70. On amiable composition, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
71. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. See Bowett, ClaimsBetween
State and PrivateEntities: The Twilight Zone of InternationalLaw, 35 CATH. U.L. REv.
929 (1986).
72. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd,
710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
73. In Switzerland, the Federal Tribunal overturned the attachment order that
LIAMCO had secured from the Zurich District Court against Libyan assets in six local
banks. The federal court did not challenge the validity of the arbitral award itself, but
ruled rather that the Zurich tribunal had no jurisdiction to order attachments against a
state when the litigation lacks a "sufficient domestic relationship." Such relationship might
be established, for example, by activities that justify jurisdictional venue in Switzerland.
Neither the location of assets in Switzerland, nor the choice of Geneva as the arbitral seat,
established a "sufficient domestic relationship" in the LIAMCO case. See Note, Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. Libyan Am. Oil Co., 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 153 (1981).
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1. The "Second Look"
Application of the parties' chosen law may lead to an unenforceable award if that law violates the public policy of the country of performance. But an arbitrator who ignores the parties'
choice of law, in order to respect mandatory norms of the country of performance, may invite challenge at the place of arbitration for excess of authority. The landmark Supreme Court
decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. 74 illustrates the arbitrator's dilemma.

In Mitsubishi, the dispute arose out of an automobile distribution agreement between a Japanese manufacturer and an
American automobile dealer. Swiss law governed the contract,
but the dispute raised an antitrust counterclaim under the
United States Sherman Act. The United States Supreme Court
ordered arbitration in the case, but warned that in the future it
would condemn, as against public policy, a choice of law clause
that operated as a "prospective waiver" of the right to pursue
Sherman Act claims.75 The Supreme Court ordered arbitration
on the assumption (perhaps naive, and perhaps incorrect) that
the arbitrator would apply the Sherman Act to the antitrust
counterclaims, even though the contract contained a Swiss
choice of law.76
More importantly, three sentences of dicta at the end of the
majority opinion predicted, on the basis of the New York Convention's explicit "public policy defense," 77 that American
courts will have another bite at the arbitration apple when the
time comes to enforce the award, to determine whether claims
under American antitrust law were addressed.78 This dicta has
74. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). See generally Park, Private Adjudicators, supra note 7; see
also Carbonneau, Mitsubishi: The -Folly of Quixotic Internationalism, 2 ARB. INT'L 178
(1986); Lowenfeld, The Mitsubishi Case: Another View, 2 ARB. INT'L 178 (1986).
75. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 ("[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choiceof-law clauses operated.in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning
the agreement as against public policy.").
76. One distinguished scholar considers the heart of the Supreme Court ruling on
arbitrability to be "mere dictum." He assumes that the arbitrators could have declined to
adjudicate the antitrust claim. Smit, Mitsubishi: It Is Not What it Seems To Be, 4 J. INT'L
ARB., Sept. 1987, at 7, 14-17.
77. New York Convention, supra note 35, art. V(2)(b) provides: "Recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement are sought finds that: ... The recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."
78. The dicta reads in part as follows: "[T]he national courts of the United States

1989]NATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL JUSTICE

669

come to be known as the second look doctrine. It is uncertain if
the second look involves a broad examination of whether the
arbitrator properly applied the law, or merely involves a
mechanical examination of whether the arbitrator in fact considered the American statute.
Mitsubishi thus exacts a problematic price for arbitrability
of antitrust matters. Judicial review of the contents of awards,
at least for their conformity with public policy, is the cost for
letting the dispute go to arbitration.
In a situation like Mitsubishi the arbitrator is in a bind. If a
contract includes a choice of law clause explicitly selecting the
legal system of a country whose competition law fundamentally
differs from that of the enforcement forum, the arbitrator, mindful of Justice Blackmun's caveat, may nevertheless decide the
antitrust claims according to United States law. This departure
from the parties' express choice of Swiss law might increase the
award's chances of enforcement in the United States, but could
open the door to a challenge of the award outside the United
States not once, but twice. First, the loser in an arbitration in
which the Sherman Act was applied could be expected to seek
annulment of the award where rendered, on the theory that the
arbitrator decided inconsistently with his mission, which is a
ground for review in most major arbitral centers. 79 Annulment
would make the award more difficult to enforce throughout the
world, because the New York Convention permits refusal of recognition to awards set aside in the country where made.80
will have the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate
interest in the enforcement of antitrust laws has been addressed... [and] to ascertain that
the [arbitral] tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them."
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638. The scope of this "prospective waiver" dicta was tested in In
re Hops, Antitrust Litigation, 655 F. Supp. 169, 172 (E.D. Mo.), appealdismissed, 832 F.2d
470 (8th Cir. 1987), involving a dispute between an American brewer and German hops
merchants. The court found no reason to believe that application of German law in a
Munich arbitration would deprive claimant of the opportunity to pursue antitrust claims.
79. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) ("manifest disregard of the law");
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982) (arbitrators exceeded their power); C. PR.
civ. art. 1502 (Fr.) (decision in a manner inconsistent with the arbitrator's mission);
L.D.I.P. art. 190(2)(c) (Switz.) ("le Tribunal arbitral a statut6 audela des demandes dont it
6tait saisi"); L.D.I.P. art. 190(2)(e) (Switz) (incompatibility with ordre public); Swiss
Intercantonal Concordat, art. 36(f) (a decision "constitut[ing] a clear violation of law or
equity"); English Arbitration Act of 1950, § 23 (arbitrator "misconduct").
80. See New York Convention, supra note 35, art. V(1)(e) ("Recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused [if] ... [t]he award has not yet become binding
on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."). The French text of art.
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Departure from the parties' chosen law also might result in
a challenge to enforcement of the award against assets outside
the jurisdiction in which the award is rendered. Article V(1)(c)
of the New York Convention permits the refusal of enforcement
to awards when arbitrators decide matters not submitted to
them, which is not a totally unreasonable characterization of an
adjudication of Sherman Act claims under a Swiss governing
law clause.
Because the mandatory national norms of the enforcement
forum, often called lois de police, arguably may apply notwithstanding the parties' choice of law clause, 81 the arbitrator could
be required to choose whether to give effect to the will of the
parties, or to respect the imperative rules of a country with a
vital interest in the subject of the dispute. Such an interest might
exist in matters such as competition law, currency controls,
trade boycott, environmental protection, and bribery. Even if
compatible with the policy of the place of arbitration, an award
might run afoul of the mandatory public law of the place of performance, thus giving rise to a refusal of recognition of the
award under article V(2) of the New York Convention.
2.

Lex Mercatoria
' '82
The principles of lex mercatoria,the new "law merchant,
add a dimension to the arbitrator's dilemma in navigating
among the legal mandates of several countries. The problem
might be illustrated by an arbitration that arose out of price fluctuation under a long-term sale contract between an American
seller and a Swiss buyer. Under a twelve-year uranium supply
agreement, the contract price soared while the market price fell,
and the Swiss buyer was unable to build the planned nuclear
power facility that would have used the uranium. In an arbitration under AAA Rules, applying New York law, the arbitrators
V(1)(e) might be interpreted as mandating rather than just permitting denial of
enforcement. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
81. See Mayer, Les Lois de Police Etrang'res1981 J. DR. INT'L 277; see also Derains,

Les Normes d'Application Immediate dans la Jurisprudence Arbitrale Internationale, in
ETUDES GOLDMAN, supra note 2, at 29; Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International

Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT'L 274 (1986).
82. See generally authorities cited supra note 2. One commentator has described lex

mercatoria as "the doctrine of generally existing rules accepted by the laws of all civilized
nations which.., seeks equitable solutions for transnational transactions, which otherwise
remain insoluble if two or three national laws are applied." Glossner, The Influence of the
International Chamber of Commerce on Modern Arbitration, in SIXTY YEARS OF ICC
ARBITRATION: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 399, 403 (1984).
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decided that the sales agreement was terminated by the price
collapse of uranium
and the denial of permission to build the
83
nuclear plant.
Let us modify these facts slightly, however, and imagine
that the law chosen in the contract had been that of Azania, a
law that is notoriously harsh on buyers. Azanian law on frustration of contract would require the Swiss buyer to fulfill its
bargain.
Could the arbitrators disregard the contract's choice of law
clause in order to apply the arguably more "pro-buyer" principles of a transnational, customary, international business law
referred to as lex mercatoria? Does it matter that judges from
the country of the defaulting buyer (against whom an award will
have to be enforced) are not unfamiliar with a doctrine that permits adapting long-term contracts to meet radically changed circumstances? 4 Does it matter that influential scholars of the
buyer's country deem international contracts to contain an obligation of execution in "good faith?"85
If the arbitrators do not consider principles of lex mercatoria permitting "good faith" adaptation of long-term contracts, might courts of the buyer's country refuse enforcement
on public policy grounds provided by the New York Convention?8 6 If the arbitrators do apply principles of lex mercatoriato
83. See discussion of the dispute between Freeport McMoran and Kern Kraftwerk
Graben, A.G., in Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-Q filed for Quarter ended
9/30/84 (S.E.C. File No. 1-8124); see also Setting Aside the Uranium Pact, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 1985, at D2, col. 1. The arbitrators who rendered the unanimous award were the
English barrister, Sir Patrick Neil; the Columbia Law Professor, Hans Smit; and the Milan
attorney, Giovani Ugi, as Chairman.
84. Adapting long-term contracts to radically different circumstances is arguably
permitted under article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code: "(1) Chacun est tenu d'exercer ses droits
et d'ex~euter ses obligations selon les r~gles de ]a bonne foi. (2) L'abus manifeste d'un droit
n'est pas prot6g6 par la loi." See also CODE CIVIL SUISSE [Cc] art. 4 (Switz.) (giving judges
power to decide in equity in certain circumstances); CODE DES OBLIGATIONS [Co] arts.
42(2), 99(3) (Switz.) (permitting damages to be fixed "equitably" under some conditions).
On how Swiss judges may exercise the power to imply a rebussic stantibus clause in a longterm contract, see cases cited in P. GAUCH, W. SCHLUEP & P. TERCIER, LA PARTIE
GENERALE DU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS (1982). Compare the attitude of American law:
UCC §§ 2-613 through 2-616. See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP (1985); Gillette, CommercialRationality and the Duty to

Adjust Long-Term Contracts,69 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1985); Trakman, Winner Take Some:
Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability,69 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985); see also W.
CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, I.C.C. ARBITRATION, supra note 2, ch. 35, at 11 n.29.
85. See Lalive, Sur la Bonne Foi dans l'Exicution des Contratsd'Etat in MfLANGES

OFFERTS A RAYMOND VANDER ELsr 425 (1986).

86. The New York Convention, supra note 35, art. V(2)(b) provides: "Recognition
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some issues, might this depeqage as to choice of law create a risk
that the award will not be enforced against assets located elsewhere, or may even be annulled because the arbitrators arguably
exceeded their powers by disregarding the parties' choice of law
clause? The arbitrator must set a course cautiously through
potentially inconsistent legal systems, which the French might
liken to Scylla and Charybdis, or which our Texan brethren
might call a rock and a hard place.
The lex mercatoria referred to in this scenario is one of the
most problematic aspects of internationalizing legal norms.
Many arbitrators perceive their mission to include application of
this non-national, customary international business law by dint
of clauses expressly authorizing them to decide on the basis of
"general principles of law" or "equitable considerations." Or
they may apply lex mercatoria when empowered to decide as
amiables compositeurs. All of these phrases permit an arbitrator
to reach his decision without relying on any particular national
legal system.
When explicit authorization to apply lex mercatoria is not
found, due to the absence in a choice of law clause of phrases
like those mentioned above, lex mercatoria may work its way
into contract interpretation by article 13(5) of the Arbitration
Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which commands arbitrators in all cases to "take account of ... the relevant usages." In the absence of a choice of law by the parties,
lex mercatoria may enter international arbitration through article 13(3) of the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber
of Commerce, permitting the arbitrator to "apply the law designated by those rules of conflict which he deems appropriate."
Although continental judges have not reacted unfavorably
8 7 English courts have traditionally been
to lex mercatoria,
unreceptive to an arbitrator's application of non-national princiand enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement [are] sought finds that: ...The recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."

87. See discussion of Norsolor v. Pabalk, Judgment of Oct. 9, 1984, Cass. civ. Ire,
Fr., 10 D.S. JUR. 101, reported in 112 J. ]JR. INT'L 679 (1985), 1985 REv. ARB. 421, and
XI Y.B.: COM. ARB. (Int'l Council Com. Arb.) 484 (1986). Arbitrators, including the
distinguished Spanish lawyer Bernardo Cremades, decided a commercial agency
termination dispute between a French and a Turkish company. The Turkish agent was

awarded an indemnity of 800,000 French francs that was based on neither French nor
Turkish law. The parties had provided for no national law to govern the merits of the
dispute. The arbitrators selected lex mercatoria after applying "appropriate" conflict of

law principles as allowed under article 13(3) of the Arbitration Rules of the International
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ples to contract disputes.8 8 An evolution in the English attitude,
however, may have been signaled by a recent Court of Appeal
decision, which recognized an award rendered in Switzerland in
which the arbitrators applied no fixed national law. 89
The content of lex mercatoria is not always apparent, at
least not to the extent necessary to permit practitioners to counsel clients with any certainty about the outcome of an arbitration. For example, it has been suggested by the most eminent
scholar in the field that lex mercatoria contains the principle
(borrowed from the public law of treaties) of rebus sic stantibus:
an implied or tacit condition in contracts that the agreement
ceases to be binding if the facts upon which it was founded are
radically changed.90 However, a study of clausula rebus sic stantibus, made for an International Chamber of Commerce seminar, concluded that arbitral case law was silent on the conditions
for the principle's application. 91
Another vexing aspect of lex mercatoria is that published
awards to guide the application of principles of lex mercatoria
are not that abundant. To be applied consistently, concepts such
as good faith performance of contracts and abuse of right require
the flesh of precedent on their doctrinal bones.
Normally, transnational substantive norms are introduced
to fill a gap left in a contract without a clear choice of law clause.
However, the uncertainty of its content, and the vagueness of its
principles, have led some lawyers to question whether lex mercatoria may not serve as an escape hatch for sloppy arbitrators
seeking to justify their disregard of the parties' intent.
Even when applied by intellectually rigorous arbitrators,
there is difficulty, at least for the time being, in determining the
content of lex mercatoriawith enough precision to permit practi92
tioners to counsel clients and predict litigation outcomes.
Chamber of Commerce. This award was ultimately upheld by the highest court in Austria
(the seat of the arbitration).
88. See M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, supra'note 68, at 594-96. Language expressing the
contrary appears in one 1978 case, Eagle Star v. Yuval Ins. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 357, 362;
see also House of Lords decision in Amin Rasheed Shipping v. Kuwait Ins. Co., 1984 App.
Cas. 50.

89. See Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft v. Ras Al Khaimah Nat'l Oil
Co., [1987] 2 All E.R. 769, discussed supra note 68.
90. See Goldman, Applicable Law, supra note 2, at 125.
91. See International Chamber of Commerce Pub. No. 440/1, Philippe, "Pactasunt
servanda" et "Rebus sic stantibus," in L'Apport de ]a Jurisprudence Arbitrale 181, 243

(1986).
92. See Mustill, supra note 2, at 149. Another eminent British lawyer has suggested
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MaintainingArbitral Integrity. The Side Effects of
Enforcing Private Dispute Resolution

Paradoxically, court intervention in arbitration results from
the business community's wish that agreements to renounce
recourse to courts should be binding on unhappy contenders
who regret their prior commitments to arbitrate. When the disappointed loser of an arbitration resists enforcement of the
award, or when one party has second thoughts about its having
agreed to binding arbitration and wavers in its willingness to go
forward with proceedings, courts asked to enforce the agreement
or the award, or to order attachment of assets, are inescapably
led to ask whether the parties ever concluded a valid arbitration
agreement, whether the dispute is covered by the arbitration
agreement, and whether the arbitrator respected the limits of his
mission and the fair play bargained for by the parties. 93 This
process brings idiosyncrasies of national law into play. To
expect court enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards
without any encroachment of national legal particularities would
be a logical impossibility, like both having and eating the proverbial cake.
Countries that support the arbitral process usually want
their courts to protect several interests: societal welfare affected
by the content in the award, a party's rights affected by an arbitrator's excess of authority or denial of due process, and the
evolution of a country's substantive law, which may stagnate if
courts are not fertilized with disputes about new problems.
Controlling an arbitrator's excess of authority may be the
most important of these national judicial functions. A legal system will not normally support an arbitrator who renders an
award against a person who did not sign the arbitration agreement, or an arbitrator who decides a dispute differently from the
way the parties agreed he should. If two merchants agree that
an arbitrator will settle disputes arising out of the sale of
peaches, but have not agreed to arbitration for a later contract to
sell pecans, then an award on pecans ought not to stand. Simipublishing arbitral awards as a way of making the content of lex mercatoria more
accessible. See Lew, The Case for Publication of Arbitration Awards, in THE ART OF
ARBITRATION 223, 231 (J. Schultsz & A. van den Berg eds. 1982).
93.

See generally A. SAMUEL,

JURISDICTIONAL

PROBLEMS IN

COMMERCIAL

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (forthcoming 1989). Courts may also be asked to decide
when recourse to arbitration is foreclosed by parallel litigation. See Metal Scrap Trade
Corp. v. Kate Shipping Co., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 767 (C.A.) (dispute over sale of ship).
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larly, if the merchants agree that the arbitrator will apply Engfish law, and he explicitly applies provisions of the Swiss Code
des obligations,such a decision normally falls outside the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
Once courts get involved in correcting errors of arbitral
jurisdiction, it may be difficult to keep them from deciding matters of contract interpretation. It is not always easy to trace the
line separating mere error of law from an excess of adjudicatory
authority. Indeed, there may be no intellectually satisfactory
test for distinguishing between an arbitrator's excess of authority
and an arbitrator's mere mistake in making a "bad award." The
judge who corrects excess of authority risks imposing his own
conclusions about the merits of the dispute.
If the arbitration agreement in the above example vaguely
referred to sales of "fruit," the scope of the arbitration agreement would be more problematic. A judge reviewing the award
would be asked to consider whether the word "fruit" was used
with its botanical meaning to include not just peaches, but also
the contents of any seed plant's developed ovary, including
pecans. 94 Likewise, if the merchants absent-mindedly referred to
the "laws of the United Kingdom," the judge might be called
upon to determine whether that ambiguous designation was
intended to refer to the law of England, Scotland, or Northern
Ireland. Finally, the arbitrator might argue that he was justified
in applying mandatory norms (loi de police) of the place of performance that supercede the chosen law.
Mobil Oil Indonesia, Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia),Ltd.95
illustrates the thin line between arbitrator excess of authority
and a merely incorrect decision on the merits of the dispute. A
94. Frequently an analogous problem arises with respect to fraudulent inducement to
contract. Whether the parties intended to arbitrate such claims may turn on subtleties in
the way the arbitration agreement was drafted. See S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v.
Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 1984). The court found that the parties, by
including language requiring arbitration of "any question or dispute aris[ing] or occur[ring]
under" the agreement, intended to include claims of fraudulent inducement within the
scope of the arbitral clause. Id. (emphasis in original). Citing the federal policy in favor of
arbitration, the court distinguished In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961),
relied on by the plaintiff, in which the same court found fraudulent inducement to be
outside a clause requiring arbitration of "any dispute or differene ... aris[ing] under" the
agreement. Judge Kearse dissented in Utah International,stating that she failed to find any
significant distinction between "disputes or controversies 'under' or 'arising out of' the
contract" in Kinoshita, and "any question or dispute... aris[ing] or occur[ring] under the
contract" in Utah International. Utah Int'l, 745 F.2d at 197; see also Mediterranean
Enters. v. Sang Yong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1983).
95. 487 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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federal court let stand an arbitrator's award of royalties on sales
of natural gas and several types of liquid hydrocarbons, even
though the contract permitted royalties only on crude oil.96
Although the court held this was not excess of authority, a contrary decision vacating the award because the arbitrator
exceeded his authority would not have been unreasonable.
The recent Eighth Circuit decision in Inter-City Gas Corp.
v. Boise Cascade Corp.97 provides a textbook example of the
alternatives open to courts asked to vacate an award for arbitrator excess of authority. In a dispute arising out of the sale of
natural gas by a Canadian supplier to a Minnesota buyer, the
arbitrator awarded damages to both parties. The seller prevailed
on its claim for damages arising from an error in measurement
of the gas supplied. The buyer prevailed on its counterclaim for
a refund of an alleged overcharge when the seller applied rates
set by the United States regulatory authorities rather than the
lower rates set by the Canadian authorities. On an appeal from
a district court order confirming both awards, the court of
appeals annulled the finding that the Canadian rate applied, but
upheld the award on the measurement error. On the rate question the court wrote that the arbitrator had ignored plain contract terms: "Although the arbitrator may interpret ambiguous
language, the arbitrator may not disregard unambiguous contract provisions." 98 On the measurement issue the court wrote
that it would "not set aside the arbitrator's award simply
because... the arbitrator erred.., in determining the facts."99
Another recent test of an arbitrator's authority occurred in
France, where the Paris Court of Appeal annulled an award rendered against the state of Egypt. 100 There the court held that
arbitration of a complicated contractual dispute about arrangements for the creation of a resort complex near the Pyramids
was nonbinding on Egypt although the arbitrators, exercising
their prerogative to determine their own competence, had
decided Egypt was subject to their jurisdiction. 10 1
96. Id. at 65-66.
97. 845 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 187.
99. Id at 189 (quoting Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986)).
100. Arab Republic of Egypt v. Southern Pac. Properties, Ltd., Judgment of July 12,
1984, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1987 J.D.I.P. (Clunet) 129; see infra notes 149-55 and
accompanying text.
101. According to the principle often referred to as compitence/compitence,
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In some countries, such as France and Switzerland, public
policy (ordre public) is also an explicit statutory ground for
annulment of awards. The constraints of this public policy may
be different when applied to international rather than domestic
arbitration. For example, usury limits 102 and the requirement of
awards with reasons" 3 have been held to be part of domestic,
but not international, ordre public. On the other hand, respect
for the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts has been held to constitute an element of international public order. 1 "
The United States Arbitration Act contains no explicit provision for vacating awards for violation of public policy. But
common law contract principles, 10 5 permitting refusal to enforce
arbitrators initially have power to determine the scope of their own jurisdiction, even if
such jurisdiction is later examined when the award is presented for judicial review or
enforcement. This rule prevents the arbitration from being unduly sabotaged and halted at
its earliest stages. The principle has been recognized in France, Switzerland, and the
United States. See C. PR. civ. art. 1466 (Fr.); Swiss Intercantonal Concordat, art. 8;
L.D.I.P. art. 186(1) (Switz.). The doctrine of "separability" of the arbitration clausepermitting its validity to be determined separately from the validity of the main contractserves a function related to that of compitence/compdtence. See Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Concklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-05 (1967). In England, the doctrine of
separability remains of uncertain scope. See Ashville Invs. v. Elmer Contracting, [1988] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 73; Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd., 1942 App. Cas. 356, [1942] 1 All E.R. 337; see
also Samuel, Separabilityin English Law-Should an Arbitration Clause Be Regarded as an
Agreement Separate and Collateral to a Contract in Which It Is Contained?, 3 J. INT'L
ARB., Sept. 1988, at 95.
102. See Judgment of June 9, 1983, Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1983 REv. ARB. 497. An
award was rendered in favor of a Liechtenstein company (Iro-Holding) that had assisted
financing (through "portaged'action") of Canadian operations of the loser. The transaction
was attacked as a disguised loan at an interest rate (19.2%) in excess of the legal French
maximum. Even if such a characterization were correct, the court held it would not violate
ordre public international, and thus the award could not be annulled. See id. at 501
(commentary by Vasseur).
103. See cases cited in J. ROBERT & T. CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, § 9.07(1).
Another example would be the prohibition on arbitration by public entities, which does not
apply to international arbitration. See Judgment of May 2, 1966, (Gelakis), Cass. civ. Ire,
Fr., 1966 D.S. Jur. 575.
104. See Judgment of March 8, 1988, (Thinet v. SRS), Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1988 D.S.
Jur. (Information Rapides) 81. The court affirmed annulment of an arbitral award against
a bankrupt company, granting damages in an amount different from the judgment of the
bankruptcy court (tribunalde commerce de Paris). The award was found to violate ordre
public internationalunder article 1502 of the French Nouveau Code de procedure civile.
The dispute, although between two French companies, was characterized as international
because it arose from a contract for construction of buildings in Saudi Arabia. The case
presents a different issue from whether bankruptcy courts themselves may as a matter of
policy respect the bankrupt party's agreement to arbitrate. See SONATRACH v. Distrigas,
infra note 179.
105. Because the Arbitration Act does not apply to "contracts of employment of...
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), it is uncertain
whether it covers collective bargaining agreements.
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contracts that violate public policy, have found their way into
labor arbitration. I"6 And the New York Convention permits
refusal of recognition to awards on the basis of a catch-all public
policy defense. 1"7
Courts will also ask whether the arbitrator has respected
due process, both as to the procedure for which the parties bargained and as to nonwaivable rights. These rights may be of
more limited scope in international arbitration than in domestic
litigation. In New York, for example, cross-examination, but
not discovery,
is considered an essential element of a fair arbitral
10 8
hearing.
To further the development of local law, some categories of
arbitration awards may be subject to a mandatory right of
appeal. In England, for example, predispute exclusion of appeal
is not possible with respect to controversies governed by English
law in the areas of commodities, shipping, and insurance, where
English law has long been pre-eminent.10 9
These national interests do not always marry well with the
reasons that impel international businessmen to resort to arbitration. Above all, the commercial community seeks neutrality,
both political and procedural. Neutrality means first avoiding
real or perceived "home town justice"-hostile or xenophobic
interference by the opposing side's government. Neutrality also
means a minimum of national procedural idiosyncracies. Crossexamination may appear as a non-neutral procedure to French
businessmen even if the judge is fair. The prospect of Americanstyle discovery would probably increase, rather than diminish,
the Frenchman's sense of uncertainty.
Ironically, insuring the political neutrality afforded by arbitration may complicate the realization of procedural neutrality.
Judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards
against recalcitrant parties unavoidably insinuates into the arbitral process elements of a national legal system, thus providing
the bargained-for non-national arbitration at the expense of
interjecting the peculiarities of the enforcement forum. 110
106. See cases discussed in United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S.
Ct. 364 (1987); see also Meltzer, After the Labor Award: The Public Policy Defense, 10
INDUS. REL. L. J. 241, 247-48 (1988).
107. New York Convention, supra note 35, art. V(2)Q,).
108. Stein & Wotman, The Arbitration Hearing, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK, 87-98 (J. McClendon & R. Goodman eds. 1986).

109. See Park, JudicialSupervision, supra note 9, at 99-101.
110. For example, when the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi compelled arbitration of

1989] NATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL JUSTICE 679
Interim measures of protection illustrate in a striking way
that policy evaluations of judicial intervention in the arbitral
process do not lend themselves to easy conclusions. Pre-award
attachment in support of arbitration increases the winner's
chance of enforcing the award, and is seemingly consistent with
the goals of the New York Arbitration Convention. However,
pre-award attachment interjects national court proceedings,
which the parties intended to avoid. In light of such conflicting
analysis, it is not surprising that one United States Court of
Appeals has held that the New York Convention prohibits preaward attachment112 in nonmaritime cases,'11 while another court
has permitted it.

Nor is it surprising that judicial review for violations of
public policy should be problematic, as recently illustrated in
Northrop Corp. v. Triad InternationalMarketing, S.A. 1 3 The
district court resisted confirming an award of commissions for
sales .ofarms to Saudi Arabia on the grounds that the arbitrators
had failed to respect both California law and American national
policy. 114 The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to upset the
award, finding that the Department of Defense policy at issue
was too ill-defined. Likewise the arbitral conclusion on the California law was not disturbed; the court held that absent manifest
disregard of the law, "mere error in interpretation of... law"
would not be enough to justify refusal to enforce the arbitrators'
decision. 1 '
III.

A.

THE INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY OF AWARDS
Seat '1 6

The Role of the Arbitral

Of the several legal orders upon which the binding character of international arbitration depends, the function of the law
the automobile manufacturer's dispute with its distributor, the Court insisted that the
distributor's antitrust counterclaim be considered under the Sherman Act, despite the
contract's Swiss choice of law clause. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-35 (1985); see Park, PrivateAdjudicators,supra note 7, at
640-51.
111. McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1038 (3d Cir.

1974).
112. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
113. 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 108 S.Ct. 261 (1987).
114. Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg., S.A., 595 F. Supp. 928, 936-40 (N.D. Cal.
1984), rev'd, 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 261 (1987).
115. Northrop, 811 F.2d at 1269.
116. Although not always co-extensive, the terms "arbitral seat," "place of the
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of the arbitral seat (frequently called the lex loci arbitri)is the
most frequently questioned. 117 Because the parties themselves,
or the supervisory arbitral institution, usually select the arbitral
situs, there has been a scramble among Western European
nations to accommodate their arbitration laws to what they perceive to be the consumers' tastes, thereby attracting a greater
share of the fees that go to lawyers and arbitrators at the place of
the proceedings.
The vital role of the arbitral situs in the viability of international arbitration derives in large measure from the11enforcement
8
scheme of the New York Arbitration Convention.
This multilateral treaty entrusts the place of arbitration
with power to enhance or to impair the international effectiveness of an award rendered within its territory by the way it exercises, or fails to exercise, its power to set the award aside. For
better or for worse, however, the New York Convention does
not spell out "acceptable" grounds for annulment. Specific
grounds for vacatur of awards are neither miandated nor prohibited. The arbitral situs is free to set aside awards for any reason
it sees fit, or for none at all.
An award will benefit from the Convention-imposed duty of
enforcement in all of the more than seventy contracting states
unless the arbitral situs uproots the award by annulment. 1 9 In
proceedings," "situs of the arbitration," and "place where the award is made" are often
used interchangeably.
The arbitrators may, for convenience, hold hearings at places other than at the arbitral
seat. For an intriguing English case on the conduct of arbitral proceedings outside the
country of arbitral seat, see Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacional
de Seguros del Peru, [1988] 1 pt. 2 Lloyd's Rep. 116 (C.A. 1987). The typed endorsement
of an insurance policy between Peruvian shipowners and Peruvian insurers provided for
"arbitration under the conditions and laws of London," but the printed conditions
provided for "jurisdiction and competence of the city of Lima." On appeal it was held that
the arbitration had its seat in London and thus English courts were competent to appoint
an arbitrator, even though hearings might be held in Peru for convenience.
117. For a survey of the rival viewpoints, see articles cited supra note 5.
118. New York Convention, supra note 35; see van den Berg, supra note 5; see also
Bernini, The Enforcementof ForeignArbitralAwardsby NationalJudiciaries: A Trialof the
N. Y.Convention'sAmbit and Workability, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION, supra note 92, at
51.
119. The arbitral seat is not omnipotent, however. Annulled awards may in some
circumstances be enforceable under the 1961 European Convention, or under the
provisions of a national arbitration law more generous than the New York Convention.
See infra notes 130, 135 and accompanying text.
It would seem an unwarranted exaggeration to suggest, in the words of one eminent
scholar and practitioner, that "successful appeal at the seat of arbitration prevents the
award from being recognized anywhere else in the world." Craig, The Uses and Abuses of
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the view of many scholars and practitioners, this power to give,
or to take away, the "international currency" of an award carries with it an obligation to provide a judicial mechanism at the
arbitral situs to control the arbitration's procedural fairness and
120
integrity.
Article III of the New York Convention requires recognition of foreign arbitral awards, giving parties to international
contracts a reasonable expectation that the parties' arbitration
commitments will be more than mere pieces of paper. The Convention generally follows a territorial approach with respect to
awards, looking to the locality of the proceedings, and covering
primarily awards rendered in12 a1 country other than the one in
which enforcement is sought.
The United States, like many other countries, applies the
Convention to foreign awards only if rendered in the territory of
another contracting state.122 This geographical reciprocity looks
to the country in which the award is rendered, and, unlike the
European Convention, gives no significance to the parties'
nationalities. 123
Appeal from International Arbitration Awards, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROADPROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1987 § 14.03, at 14-14
(1987) (emphasis in original), and "[a] successful appeal . . . leaves [an award]
unenforceable anywhere.. . ." Id § 14.01, at 14-3. The contrary view is expressed in
Paulsson, supra note 59, at 148.
120. A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 42-43 (1986); cf Craig, supra note 119, at ch. 14.
121. The Convention's scope also extends to awards "not considered as domestic."
New York Convention, supra note 35, art. I(1). One American case has interpreted "nondomestic" to include an award rendered in the United States in a dispute between foreign
parties relating to a commercial transaction occurring outside the United States. Bergesen
v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983), involved a charter party between a
Norwegian ship owner and a Swiss company transporting chemicals between the United
States, Europe, and the Caribbean. After an award in favor of the shipowner (Bergesen),
enforcement attempts were unsuccessful in Switzerland. Bergesen then petitioned for
"confirmation" of the award in New York under the three-year period provided by Title II
of the United States Arbitration Act (covering New York Convention cases), rather than
the one-year period for domestic arbitration. After a survey of the purposes and legislative
history of the New York Convention, the court of appeal aflirmed the district court's
decision to give the convention a scope wide enough to cover the scenario at bar.
122. The United States applies the Convention also to local awards deemed "nondomestic." See discussion of Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., supra note 121.
123. The United States does not apply the Convention to awards or agreements
arising out of legal relationships entirely between American citizens, including a company
incorporated or having a principal place of business in the United States. An exception to
this rule is made when the underlying transaction involves foreign-situs property or
performance of the contract abroad.
The Convention's scope with respect to arbitration agreements is ill-defined. Article
11(3) requires enforcement of arbitration agreements without defining which agreements
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A court of a contracting state may refuse recognition and
enforcement of an award only on the basis of one of the limited
litany of defenses enumerated in article V of the Convention.
These include five procedural defects: lack of a valid arbitration
agreement, denial of an opportunity to be heard, an excess of
jurisdiction by an arbitrator in deciding matters beyond the
scope of the arbitration submission, procedure contrary to the
parties' agreement, and annulment of the award under the law of
the country in which it was rendered. 124
This last defense permits the forum in which enforcement is
sought to deny recognition of an award set aside by a court of
"the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made." 125 The Convention makes no distinction among the
various grounds on which the award was set aside, whether for a
matter as serious as arbitrator corruption or as parochial as failure to state reasons. 126
The English version of article V(1)(e) is permissive, stating
that an award "may" be refused recognition and enforcement if
set aside under the law of the country in which it was rendered. 127 The equally authoritative French text, however, is
fall within its scope. The leading scholar on the Convention supports a broad
interpretation, including agreements providing for arbitration in a state other than the
enforcement forum, or agreements that are international by their subject matter or the
nationality of the parties. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note .5,
at 56-71.
124. New York Convention, supra note 35, art. V. These procedural defects, which
must be asserted and proven by the resisting party, permit the court to avoid lending its

power to support a fraudulent or unfair arbitration, but are not intended to permit judicial
review of the merits of the dispute.
Two additional defenses against recognition of an arbitral award are open to a court
on its own motion, without any proof by the party resisting the award: that the subject
matter is not arbitrable, and that enforcement would violate the forum's "public policy."
Id While the first five Convention defenses relate generally to public policy in the sense
that they are safeguards against injustice, the final defense serves as an explicit catch-all for
the forum's particular substantive public policy.
125. Id. art. V(1)(e).
126. French procedural law requires that arbitration awards contain reasons. C. PR.
civ. art. 1471 (Fr.). See cases discussed by M. DE BOISSfSON, supra note 1, at 344. In an
international arbitration, however, the parties may dispense with this requirement, which is
not a matter of mandatory public policy (ordrepublicinternational).See cases discussed in
J. ROBERT & T. CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, § 6.06, at I:610-11:613. American practice
discourages written opinions with reasons. The President of the American Arbitration
Association has argued that written opinions are "dangerous because they identify targets
for the losing party to attack." R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You
NEED TO KNOW 29 (3d ed. 1986); cf Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with

Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of InternationalTransactions,23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 579 (1985); see also Lew, supra note 92.
127. New York Convention, supra note 35, art. V(1)(e).

1989] NATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL JUSTICE 683
more forceful, and led at least one French court to state that
execution of an annulled award must be refused.
("L'execution
128
d'une sentence arbitrale doit &re refusee.")

An annulled award might still be recognized under the
enforcement forum's domestic law, whose intricate interplay
with the Convention is illustrated by recent case law of the
French Cour de cassation.129 Or, if the parties are from countries
adhering to the European Convention, its more liberal enforcement provisions might benefit the award.1 30 The New York
Convention, however, would impose no duty to grant enforcement. 131 To suggest an admittedly imperfect analogy from
128. Judgment of June 20, 1981, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1981 REv. ARB. 424, 426. The
French text of the Convention states: "La reconnaissance et l'exrcution de la sentence ne
seront refus6es . . . que si . . . la sentence . . . a t6 annulre ou suspendue ... .
("Recognition and enforcement will not be refused... unless... the award was annulled
or suspended."). Id; New York Convention 330 U.N.T.S. at 41-43. Following arbitration
in Switzerland of a dispute between French and Canadian parties, the Paris Tribunal de
grande instance granted leave to enforce the award in France. Three months later, the
cantonal Cour de justice in Geneva annulled the award as "arbitrary." The Paris Cour
d'appel then quashed the lower court decision, refusing recognition in France to an award
set aside under the law of the place where rendered. However, in light of the subsequent
enactment of the Nouveau Code deprocidurecivile article 1502 and the Judgment of Oct. 9,
1984, discussed at infra note 129, Berardiv. Clair must be considered effectively overruled,
and annulment of an award where rendered generally irrelevant to its enforcement and
recognition in France. Article VII of the New York Convention provides that any
interested party may avail himself of an award to the extent allowed under the law of the
enforcement forum. Code de procidurecivile article 1502 does not list annulment where
rendered as a grounds for refusal of recognition to a foreign award. On the application of
these principles in France, see generally Judgment of Feb. 18, 1986, Cour d'appel, Paris,
1986 Rnv. ARB. 155; see also commentary by Robert, 1981 REv. ARB. 530, 541; Bellet &
Mezger, L'arbitrageinternationaldans le nouveau code de procidure civile, 1981 REVUE
CRrrIQUE DE DROIT INT'L PRIVt 611, 648-649; Mayer, L'Insertion de la Sentence dans
l'OrdreJuridiqueFran ais, in DROIT ET PRATIQUE DE L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL EN
FRANCE [R.C.D.I.P.] 81, 100 (Y. Derains ed. 1984); Mezger, Dix Questions Relatives au
Titre VI du Livre IV NCPC, 1981 REv. ARB. 542, 548 ("Le catalogue des nullit~s de
'article 1502... ne tient aucun compte du sort de la sentence dans [l'Etat d'origine de la
sentence]").
129. Pabalk v. Norsolor, Judgment of Oct. 9, 1984, Cour de cassation, Cass. civ. Ire,
Fr., 1985 REv. ARB. 431, with commentary by B. Goldman, 112 J. DR. INT'L (CLUNET)
679 (1985), with commentary by Ph. Kahn. (Commercial agency agreement between
French company and Turkish agent. Arbitral award rendered in Austria applying lex
mercatoriaquashed by the Vienna Appeals Court (later reversed by the Austrian Supreme
Court) led to a refusal of exequaturby the Paris Courd'appel in 1982, reversed by the Cour
de cassation, which held that French courts had a duty to determine whether the award was
enforceable under French internal law.).
130. On the European Convention of 1961, see infra note 136 and accompanying
text.
131. The New York Convention expressly contemplates this possibility in article VII,
which provides that its provisions "shall not ... deprive any interested party of any right he
may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by
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American constitutional law, it would be as if a sister-state judgment no longer benefited from full faith and credit.
B.

"Delocalization"fromTwo Perspectives

The role of the arbitral seat may be viewed from two different policy perspectives: that of the country in which the award
is rendered, and that of the country asked to enforce the award.
The perspective of the arbitral situs will be concerned with
grounds for review. Should the arbitral seat ever review awards
in international commercial disputes? If so, should courts at the
situs intervene to correct errors of law on the merits of the dispute? Or should the place of the arbitration limit itself to examining the arbitrator's respect for his mission and for the
proceedings' basic fairness, called due process in the United
States and natural justice in England?
The observer at the enforcement forum, on the other hand,
will ask whether an award, annulled where rendered, should be
enforceable in other countries in which the loser has assets. If
so, under what circumstances? While the enforcement forum
may always impose its own standards for review (as long as
these are consistent with treaty obligations), it is less than clear
in both law and policy whether the enforcement forum should
always, or ever, recognize nullification of an award by courts of
the place of the arbitration.
Both sets of questions are prompted by an understandable
desire to further a more uniform system of international dispute
resolution. Both inquiries essentially ask to what extent arbitral
awards should be subject to the jurisdiction of judges at the place
of the proceedings. And from both perspectives, the policy
dilemma derives in large measure from the New York Convention's failure to define acceptable grounds for annulment at the
place where the award is made.
Continental scholars who favor "floating" awards and delocalized arbitration will see reduction or elimination of judicial
review of awards by courts of the arbitral situs as a trend that
promotes the wishes of the parties without necessarily violating
the vital interest of the arbitral seat. In a transnational dispute,
the arbitration usually will have its economic or social impact
outside the borders of the place of the proceedings.
the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon." New
York Convention, supra note 35, art. VII.
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This trend toward delocalized arbitration may pose its own
problems, however, if carried so far as to eliminate all scrutiny of
awards at the seat of the arbitration, as has been done in
Belgium. Unless an award is subject to challenge where rendered for violation of minimum standards of procedural fairness
(such as excess of authority or fraud), the loser may be forced to
challenge the defective award in any country in which assets
may be subject to execution of the award. And a losing claimant
may have no recourse at all through the arbitral process for the
simple reason that there will be no award to enforce.
The "shift in the control function" from the arbitral situs to
the execution forum 132 also involves an increased role for courts
in the loser's home country, where the loser most likely will have
assets. The implications of this migration toward non-neutral
judges have been recognized, although not necessarily accepted,
133
by arbitration lawyers.

1. Grounds for Review: The Perspective of the Arbitral Seat
Judicial review of awards where rendered generally falls
into two categories: full review on the legal merits; 134 and limited review for conformity to basic procedural fairness, including
arbitrator fraud and excess of authority. 135 The former seeks to
maximize legal certainty concerning the merits of the dispute;
132. See Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational Commercial
Arbitration, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 241-42 (1981).
133. Craig, supra note 119, § 14.09, at 14-40.
134. See discussion of the 1979 Arbitration Act in Park, JudicialSupervision, supra
note 9.
135. For a discussion of the matters covered by review of an arbitration's procedural
fairness, see Craig, supra-note 119, § 14.11, at 14-44 through 14-49; see also Kolkey,
Attacking Arbitral Awards: Rights of Appeal and Review in InternationalArbitrations, 22
INT'L LAW. 693 (1988); Schmitthoff, Finality of Arbitral Awards and JudicialReview, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 230 (J. Lew ed. 1986).
The United States since 1925 has followed a model of restricting review of awards to
matters of basic procedural fairness. Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 10 (1982), provides for an order vacating an award on four grounds:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them;
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the shbject matter submitted
was not made.
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the latter looks to ensure an arbitration's integrity while minimizing judicial meddling with the substantive results.
Recently, a third model has emerged in Belgium, under
which the arbitral situs will not set aside an award for any reason, including an arbitrator's fraud or excess of authority.
Under this system of "non-review," an entity that never signed
the arbitration agreement (perhaps joined in the arbitration
merely because of its relationship-to another party) will not have
a chance to litigate the arbitrator's jurisdiction when the award
is rendered. Nor would there then be an opportunity to review
errors on choice of law or arbitral rules. If the parties agreed on
English law to govern the contract and UNCITRAL Rules to
govern procedure, the arbitrator might apply French law and
AAA rules without the loser being able to challenge these
defects unless the award is presented for enforcement at a later
time. In this model, a legal system supports arbitration within
its borders without providing minimum safeguards of basic
justice.
2.

Effect of Annulled Awards: The Perspective of the
Enforcement Forum

Delocalization raises questions for the enforcement forum
as well as the arbitral situs. Suppose an arbitral award rendered
in Azania is set aside there on the ground that the parties did not
validly consent to arbitration. Should the award be enforceable
in the United States, where the loser has assets, if the United
States takes a contrary view from that of Azania regarding the
validity of the arbitration agreement? What should an American court do if an Azanian judge sets aside the award for reasons
that are not grounds for annulment in the United States, such as
mere error of law or fact, or refusal by a minority arbitrator to
sign the award?
Deference to Azanian nullification would be required if the
arbitration were covered by the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. Known as the Geneva Convention of 1961, this treaty applies to disputes between nationals
Public policy may also come into play explicitly if courts are asked to confirm an
award under 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982), which refers to New York Arbitration Convention
defenses to enforcement of awards.
The grounds for challenge of awards in international arbitration in European arbitral
centers (Belgium, England, France, The Netherlands and Switzerland) are summarized at
supra note 19.

1989] NATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL JUSTICE

687

of different contracting states, which the United States at present
is not. Annulment of an award in its country of origin constitutes a ground for refusal of recognition under the 1961 Geneva
Convention only when the annullment was for specifically enumerated reasons. Thus, awards rendered in a state that adheres
to the 1961 Geneva Convention may occasionally have greater
"international currency" than those of other countries, remaining enforceable under the treaty even after annulment by local
courts. The Convention provides that an award annulled where
rendered shall nevertheless be enforced unless annulment was
for treaty-enumerated reasons: (1) a void agreement, (2) lack of
proper notice or inability to present a case, (3) excess of authority (decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
agreement), and (4) irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal. 136 The European Convention applies only to awards rendered in another contracting state arising from agreements
between residents of contracting states. Thus when an award
rendered in Paris between a Frenchman and an Italian is
presented for enforcement in Italy after annulment for a violation of French ordre public, the Italian court would not be entitled to refuse to enforce the award on the grounds of the French
136. Convention article IX provides:
The setting aside in a Contracting State of an arbitral award covered by this
Convention shall only constitute a ground for the refusal of recognition or
enforcement in another Contracting State where such setting aside took place in a
State in which, or under the law of which, the award has been made and for one
of the following reasons:
(a) the parties to the arbitration agreement were under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity or the said agreement is not valid under the law
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) the party requesting the setting aside of the award was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not
so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration need not be set aside;
(d) the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or failing such agreement, with
the provisions of Article IV of this Convention.
This provision applies only to awards rendered in other contracting states, most of which
have amended their internal law to provide similar grounds for annulment. Thus it will be
rare that awards set aside where rendered will be exposed to enforcement abroad under the
1961 Geneva Convention, supra note 41.
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annulment alone. If, however, the other party in the arbitration
was an American or an Englishman, the annulled award could
be refused recognition, since neither the United States nor the
United Kingdom adheres to the European Convention.
Enforcing an award annulled in its country of origin would
seem appropriate when the local judiciary dishonestly annulled
the award. But if the award were set aside by an honest judge,
although on grounds peculiar to the law of the place of the proceedings, it is uncertain whether enforcement by a forum not
sharing these grounds for review would further or defeat the
goal of efficient trans-border dispute resolution.
One articulate practitioner has suggested that delocalization
would make developing nations more acceptable as arbitration
venues to parties from industrialized countries. 137 He argues
that Western business managers may. distrust arbitration conducted in the so-called Third World, fearing a lack of judicial
independence from the executive branch of government, which
could make local courts prone to annul awards rendered against
state enterprises. To neutralize this perceived risk, he proposes
that the parties might subject the arbitration to a procedural
law-a lex arbitri-otherthan that of its situs, and thus avoid
the effects of local annulment.
Unfortunately, this attempt to bring developing nations into
a fuller participation in the arbitral process might actually
aggravate the enforcement problem. In permitting nonrecognition of awards, article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention uses
the disjunctive "or": enforcement of an award may be refused if
set aside "by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made." 138 Thus, the
choice of another lex arbitrimight boomerang and open the way
to two annulments rather than one, assuming that courts of the
country whose law was chosen would accept jurisdiction.
The res judicata effect of an unsuccessful annulment action
raises another intriguing question about the influence of the arbitral seat. Would a French judgment (rendered in an unsuccessful action to annul an award made in Paris) holding an
arbitration agreement valid preclude the agreement's validity
from being raised as a defense in an action to enforce the award
in New York?
137. See Paulsson, supra note 59, at 148.
138. New York Convention, supra note 35, art. V(1)(e).
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The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides in section 481 that "a final judgment of a court of a foreign
state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or determining interests
in property, is conclusive between the parties, and is entitled to
recognition in courts in the United States."' 139 Similar principles
are contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
and in recent English case law.140 Comment (b) of section 481 of
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides that
recognition would arise "where either side in a litigation seeks to
rely on prior determination of an issue of fact or law" relevant to
an action pending in the forum. 14 1 In other words, a foreign
judgment will be given issue preclusion or collateral estoppel
effect.
At present the author knows of no case in which an award
creditor has attempted to assimilate an unsuccessful vacatur
action to the type of money judgments covered by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law. When such cases do arise, however, characterization of the issues may not yield to facile analysis when matching the local grounds for vacatur with grounds
for refusal of recognition under the New York Convention article V.
IV.

TRENDS IN NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW

While French statutory and case law have affirmed the
vitality of judicial control at the situs of the arbitration, legislative changes during the last decade in England, Belgium, and
Switzerland have gone in the opposite direction, and have
expanded arbitral autonomy. Vying for a greater share of the
fees paid to arbitrators and attorneys at the seat of an arbitra139.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 481(1) (1986).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1969) provides that "[a]
valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will
be recognized in the United States." The reciprocity requirement applied by federal courts
has received little approval from commentators or state courts, and today is ignored even in
many federal cases because the Erie rule in diversity cases compels federal courts to follow
state law. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227-28 (1895). For a recent English case on
issue estoppel, see The Sennar, 1985 W.L.R. 490 (H.L.). On res judicata and foreign
judgments, see generally Casad, supra note 42; see also Juenger, The Recognition of Money
Judgments in Civil and CommercialMatters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1988).
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 481 comment b (1986).
STATES
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tion, the marketing strategy of these nations includes legislative
reform of arbitration law to create a more laissez-faire standard
of review for international arbitration, perceived by these nations
as attractive to some arbitral consumers.
In light of these reforms, and considering Sylvia Plath's
advice that "[tihe abstract kills, [but] the concrete saves,"' 142 it
might be well now to consider some of the specific fields on
which battles over the role of the arbitral seat are being fought
today.
Resisting Arbitral Anarchy: The French Model
The French Arbitration Decree of 1981 was intended to
insure the procedural integrity of an arbitration but not to permit courts to second guess arbitrators on matters of law or fact.
In the celebrated Gdtaverken case, 143 the Paris Court of Appeal
held itself without jurisdiction to hear a challenge of an award in
an I.C.C. arbitration between Swedish and Libyan entities. 44 In
response, commentators urged legislative clarification of the role
of French courts with respect to international commercial arbitration taking place in France. 45 A completely laissez-faire
approach, it seemed, might impede the efficient operation of
international arbitration by making foreign courts less inclined
to grant enforcement of an award rendered in an international
arbitration in France where it was subject to little or no judicial
control. The foreign court might feel it necessary to supply its
own control mechanism, perhaps through a more liberal use of
the New York Convention defenses to recognition of foreign
awards. The more exacting enforcement procedure that ensued
might harm the efficiency of international commercial arbitration. Moreover, it was argued that basic fairness required that a
loser in a defective arbitration should be able to have the award
set aside, once and for all, where rendered.
Thus, in 1981 France promulgated a decree applying specif14 6
ically to arbitration that "implicates international commerce."'

A.

142. SYLVIA PLATH, THE JOURNALS OF SYLVIA PLATH 287 (1982).
143. General Nat'l Maritime Transp. Co. v. Socidtd Gdtaverken Aidenal A.B.,
Judgment of February 21, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1980 REv. ARB. 524.

144. On the Gdtaverken cases, see Craig, Park & Paulsson, French Codification,supra
note 58, at 731-32.
145. See Fouchard, Les Recours Contre Les Sentences Non Franqaises, 1980 REV.
ARB. 693, 694; see also Fouchard, [1980] J. DR. INT'L 660, 675-76.
146. Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981, adding articles 1442-1507 to Nouveau Code
de procedure civile. See generally Audit, A National Codification of International
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The decree, among other things, added article 1502 to the
Nouveau Code de procdure civile, setting forth the grounds on
which an international award rendered in France may be
annulled. This balanced approach to delimiting judicial intervention in international arbitration provides that awards may be
annulled:
(1) if the arbitrator decided in the absence of an arbitration
agreement or in reliance on a void or expired agreement;
(2) if the arbitral tribunal was improperly constituted or the
sole arbitrator was improperly appointed;
(3) if the arbitrator decided without complying with the mission conferred upon him;
(4) where the adversary principle has not been complied with;
(5) if the recognition or execution is contrary to international
public policy.147
The Netherlands in 1986 enacted a new arbitration law containing grounds for review that were inspired by the 1981
French decree, although it makes no distinction
between review
148
of domestic and international arbitration.
The French decree was tested three years after its promulgation in the case of Arab Republic of Egypt v. Southern Pacific
Properties,Ltd.,149 in which the Court of Appeal of Paris set an
award aside on the ground that the arbitrator decided in the
absence of a "'valid arbitration agreement or... on the basis of
a void or expired agreement.' "150 A Hong Kong company
named South Pacific Properties (SPP) in 1974 had concluded a
contract entitled "Heads of Agreement," signed by the Minister
of Tourism of Egypt and the Egyptian General Organization for
Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH), providing for a joint venture
company to develop two resort complexes, one of which was
near the Pyramids. SPP was permitted to assign its rights and
obligations to a subsidiary, SPP (Middle East), which it later
Commercial Arbitration

The French Decree of May 12, 1981, in RESOLVING

TRANSNATIONAL DIsPuTEs THROUGH ARBITRATION 117 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984);

Craig, Park & Paulsson, French Codification, supra note 58.
147. C. PR. CIV. art. 1502 (Fr.).

148. See Sanders, The New Dutch Arbitration Act, 3 ARB. INT'L 194 (1987).
149. Judgment of July 12, 1984, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1987 J.D.I.P. (Clunet) 129; 1986

REv. ARB. 75; W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, I.C.C. ARBITRATION, app. V,
addendum 1, at 13 (1986); 23 I.L.M. 1048 (E.Gaillard trans. 1984). See discussion by
Stanton, The Court of Appeal of Parisand Lack ofArbitralJurisdiction,2 ARB. INT'L 220,
228-29 (1986).

150. Judgment of July 12, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1048, 1055, 1061 (quoting art. 1502-1, C.
PR. CIV.).
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did. The Heads of Agreement did not contain an arbitration
clause. However, a subsequent agreement between SPP and
EGOTH did. The Minister of Tourism signed the later agreement, but added the words "approved, agreed and ratified."''
After the project was cancelled, an I.C.C. arbitral tribunal rendered an award against the Republic of Egypt in favor of SPP
for damages in an amount of $12.5 million. 5 ,
It was uncertain whether the Minister of Tourism had
bound Egypt as a party to the arbitration clause, or whether,
wearing his hat as a government regulator, he had intervened
only in a supervisory capacity with respect to EGOTH. The
arbitrators opted for the first interpretation. But the Paris Cour
d'appel, confirmed by the French Cour de cassation,153 opted for
the second, and the award against the Egyptian state was set
aside.
The grounds for review in France, contained in article 1502,
would seem on their face entirely appropriate to a modern arbitration statute. There is nothing unusual about court scrutiny of
an award to determine whether the loser did in fact sign the arbitration agreement. What is less clear is how the grounds for
challenge should be applied. Should the judge limit his role to a
minimal check on the arbitrators' possible distortion of the contract (dinaturation),or should he engage in a full examination
of all issues presented by a jurisdictional challenge?154 Commentary has suggested that in SPP the court's standard of review
was too liberal. In particular, one scholar has questioned the
court's disregard of the testimony of witnesses whom the arbitrators found entirely credible. 55
151. Id. at 1051.
152. Id.
153. Judgment of Jan. 6, 1987, Cass. eiv. Ire, Fr., 1987 J.D.I.P. (Clunet) 469 (with
commentary by Pf. Leboulanger), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1004 (E. Gaillard trans. 1987).
154. Southern PacificPropertiesalso illustrates the influence of the law of the place of
arbitration. On the 12th day of July, 1984, the award was both annulled by a court in Paris
and recognized by a court in Amsterdam (Judgment of July 12, 1984, District Court,
Amsterdam, reprintedin 24 I.L.M. 1040-45 (A.J. van den Berg trans. 1985)). One can only
speculate about what the result would have been if the French decision had come a day
earlier or the Dutch decision a day later. The Paris annulment led the parties to agree to a
stay of further proceedings in the Netherlands pending disposition of the appeal of the
annulment in Paris. This ultimately led to dismissal of the Dutch action after confirmation
of the Cour d'appel decision by the Cour de cassation.
155. See Najar, L'Affaire du Plateau des Pyramides: Reflexion sur lePouvoir de
Controle du Juge de l'Annulation en Matiere d'Arbitrage International(Paris I, Memoire
D.E.S.S. en Commerce Ext6rieur 1987).
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156
Excluding JudicialReview by Contract

In 1979, England enacted legislation to permit "exclusion
agreements." These agreements will eliminate most, but not all,
judicial review of arbitration awards rendered in England and
Wales in international disputes. 157 If the parties have not
entered into a valid exclusion agreement, courts may hear
appeals from an arbitrator's decision on matters of law.
An award may still be set aside for arbitrator "misconduct," regardless of an exclusion agreement, 158 and therefore
English courts will continue to be able to ensure the basic integrity of the arbitral process. Recent court decisions have made
clear that correcting "misconduct" will not serve as an excuse
for backdoor judicial tampering with the merits of an arbitration, but will rather be a means to guarantee the fundamental
integrity of the arbitral process. 59 This attitude contrasts
sharply with the practice before the 1979 reforms, when the term
"misconduct" was applied to a multitude of petty procedural
omissions. 16o
The 1979 Act requires an exclusion agreement to be in writing. In 1983, the High Court held that reference to institutional
arbitration rules, such as those of the International Chamber of
Commerce, constitutes the incorporation of a valid "exclusion
agreement" if such rules stipulate the waiver of a right to appeal,
as does article 24 of the Arbitration Rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce. 16' Exclusion agreements will also eliminate interlocutory appeals on questions of law.
Exclusion agreements will not be valid if English law
156. On English arbitration law, see generally M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, supra note
68; Samuel, Developments in English ArbitrationLaw Since the 1987Antaios Decision, 5 J.
INT'L ARB., Sept. 1988, at 9.

157. One member of the House of Lords estimated that this reform would bring
England 500 million pounds sterling of "invisible exports" such as arbitrators' and lawyers'
fees. 392 PARTZ. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 99 (1978); see Park, JudicialSupervision, supra note 9,
at 89, 96.
158. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 27, § 23.
159. See Bank Mellat v. GAA Development & Constr. Co., [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 44,
45 (Q.B.) (majority arbitrators refuse to convene further meetings at request of dissenter).
160. The 1978 Commercial Court Committee stated that "misconduct" covered even
"procedural errors and omissions by arbitrators who are doing their best to uphhold the
highest standards of the profession." COMMERCIAL COURT COMMITTEE, REPORT ON
ARBrrRATION, CMND. No. 7284, at 17, para. 67. The last ten years, however, have

witnessed a trend toward judicial unwillingness to characterize minor procedural omissions
as misconduct. See Bank Mellat, [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 44.
161. Arab African Energy Corp. v. Olieprodukten Nederland B.V., [1983] Lloyd's
Rep. 419 (Q.B.).
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applies to the substantive merits of the dispute and if the controversy relates to insurance, commodities, or shipping. Thus, current commercial controversies will continue to fertilize the
development of English case law in areas in which it has long
been pre-eminent.
Finally, exclusion agreements entered into before the dispute arises will not be valid if all parties are British residents or
nationals. Domestic interests will be protected through normal
appellate procedures. While rare in international arbitration, it
is not impossible that all 'parties could be British. The Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce may
cover arbitration between British nationals when the dispute
arises from a contract that implicates international commerce.
C. Going All the Way in Belgium
In 1985, Belgians moved toward arbitral autonomy by
amending their Code judiciaire to provide that if all parties are
non-Belgian, an award rendered in Belgium is not subject to an
action for annulment. Article 1717 of the Belgian Code
judiciaire provides:
Courts of Belgium may hear a request for annulment only if at
least one of the parties to the dispute decided by the award is
either a physical person having Belgian nationality or residence, or a legal entity created in Belgium
or having a Belgian
162
branch or other seat of operation.
The provision is mandatory. Unlike Switzerland, Belgium permits no possibility for foreigners to opt for local judicial review.
Belgian "verve and panache" has been greeted as
"salutory" by commentators who favor giving international businessmen the alternative of an arbitration that is "totally
'
unbound."163
162. Law of March 27, 1985 (Belg.), enacting CODE JUDICIARE art. 1717. The

French text reads:
Les tribunaux belges ne peuvent connaltre d'une demande en annulation que

lorsqu'au moins une partie au diffrrend tranch6 par la sentence arbitrale est soit
une personne physique ayant la nationalit6 beige ou une residence en Belgique,

soit une personne morale constituie en Belgique ou y ayant une succursale on un
siage quelconque d'opfration.
In cases where actions for annulment are permitted (i.a, when a Belgian is a party to the
arbitratibn), grounds include violation of ordre public, excess of jurisdiction, an award's
lack of reasons, fraud, and violation of due process. See Codejudiciaireart. 1704(2) (Law
of July 4, 1972, Aug. 8, 1972).

163. See Paulsson, supra note 3, at 71. Others have referred to Belgium even more
enthusiastically as a "paradise for international commercial arbitration." See Storme,

1989] NATIONAL LAWAND COMMERCIAL JUSTICE 695
Such exuberance may be questioned, precisely because arbitration in Belgium is not totally delocalized. Belgian courts may
intervene at pre-award stages to assist the arbitration in matters
such as nomination of arbitrators, gathering evidence and provisional measures to preserve property. And awards rendered in
Belgium continue to benefit from recognition and enforcement
under the New York Convention. 16 Winners of defective arbitral awards that have not been annulled can be expected to try to
enforce the awards wherever the loser has assets. Even if not
ultimately successful, such enforcement attempts will cost the
loser time and expense that can hardly be reconciled with the
fair operation of a private adjudicatory system. When the victim
of procedural irregularities is the losing claimant, the results of
arbitral autonomy are even more unfair. If denied the opportunity to have the award set aside where rendered, the unsuccessful claimant has no enforcement forum in which to contest the
defective award, since there is nothing to enforce. Its only path
to justice will be litigation, notwithstanding the bargain to
arbitrate.
The Belgian state thus directly and indirectly assists the
arbitrator in his creation of legal rights and duties, but refuses to
take responsibility for insuring the integrity of the process. The
loser in a defective arbitration in Belgium may be required to
resist enforcement wherever in the world it has assets or, if a
claimant, may be denied any recourse at all though the arbitral
process.
D. Switzerland's Hybrid System

1

65

The Swiss in 1987 amended their federal conflicts of law
Belgium: A Paradisefor International Commercial Arbitration, 14 IN'L Bus. LAW. 294
(1986). A more realistic appraisal was given by Celia Hampton, doubting whether the new
law presented "a real attraction." Hampton, Belgium's Radical Move on Arbitration,
Financial Times, Aug. 1, 1985, at Business Law, col. 1. See generally Vanderelst,
Increasing the Appeal of Belgium as an InternationalArbitration Forum?- The Belgian
Law of March 27, 1985 Concerning the Annulment of ArbitralAwards, 3 J. INT'L ARB.,
June, 1986, at 77.
164. As expressed by one Belgian commentator, "International arbitral awards
rendered in Belgium are foreign awards within the meaning of the New York Convention
because they are still, to a large extent, governed by Belgian law." Vanderelst, supra note
163, at 85.
165. See generally Blessing, The New InternationalArbitrationLaw in Switzerland, 5
J. INT'L ARB., June, 1988, at 9; Lalive, The New Swiss Law on InternationalArbitration,4
ARB. INT'L 2 (1988); Poncet & Gaillard, IntroductoryNote and Translation, 27 I.L.M. 37
(1988).
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rules by statute referred to as the L.D.I.P. (Loifiddiralesur le
droitinternationalprive). When the new statute enters into force
on January 1, 1989, parties to international arbitration in Switzerland will have a choice between three regimes: (1) broad
review for "arbitrariness," including "violation of law or
1 66
equity," under the Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat;
(2) complete autonomy, if all parties are non-Swiss and have
concluded an explicit agreement ("djclaration expresse") to
exclude court challenge entirely; 167168or (3) limited court review
for matters of procedural fairness.
If the parties neither elect cantonal procedure nor explicitly
exclude judicial review, the L.D.I.P. provides five bases for challenge of awards: (1) irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal or incorrect appointment 6f the sole arbitrator; (2) an
erroneous decision by the arbitral tribunal with respect to its
own jurisdiction; (3) an award beyond the issues submitted to
the arbitrators, or failure to decide claims within the request for
arbitration; (4) failure to respect the principle of equal treatment
of the parties or the right to adversarial proceedings ("droit
d'etre entendu en procidure contradictoire");(5) incompatibility
of the award with public policy (ordre public).1 69 Challenge to
the award must be made before the Federal Supreme Court in
Lausanne unless the parties have expressly agreed to substitute
review by the cantonal court of the arbitral seat.
Review of awards may be excluded under L.D.I.P. article
192 by an explicit agreement (diclarationexpresse) in the arbitration clause if no party is a Swiss resident or has a Swiss permanent establishment. Because waiver of the right to judicial
review of the award must be explicit, reference to institutional
arbitration rules containing renunciation of appeal provisions
166. ConcordatSuisse sur l'Arbitrage,article 36(f): "An Action for annulment of the

arbitral award may be brought before the judicial authority... where it is alleged ...that
the award is arbitrary in that it was based on findings which were manifestly contrary to
the facts appearing on the file, or in that it constitutes a clear violation of law or equity."
See Neyroud & Park, Predestinationand Swiss Arbitration Law: Geneva's Application of the
International Concordat, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1983-84). For the text of the Concordat
Suisse sur l'Arbitrage in French, see P. JOLIDON, COMMENTAIRE DU CONCORDAT SUISSE
SUR L'ARBITRAGE (1984).

167. Swiss Loi Federalede Droit InternationalePrivd (L.D.I.P.) art. 192, permitting
exclusion of review when both parties reside outside Switzerland.
translation, see 27 I.L.M. 55-56 (Poncet & Gaillard trans. 1988).
168. L.D.I.P. art. 190(2) (Switz.).
169. Id.

For an English
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(such as article 24 of the International Chamber of Commerce
Rules) will not be sufficient to exclude review.
The parties may elect to apply cantonal rather than federal
procedure. In most cases this will mean the Intercantonal Concordat, which permits judicial review of awards on nine grounds,
including "arbitrariness,"
defined to encompass "clear violation
170
of law or equity."

E.

Striking a Balance

Belgium's 1985 legislation is the most problematic of the
recent reforms. The law provides for no judicial challenge of
awards in arbitration between foreigners. Even outright arbitral
fraud would appear to escape judicial control.
The recent Swiss federal law is more sensitive to the diverse
interests implicated in an international arbitration. The law permits, but does not mandate, complete exclusion of review by
consent of foreign parties.
The Dutch, English, and French reforms provide
mandatory control of an arbitration's procedural integrity,
which should allay fears of arbitral anarchy, while limiting court
intervention to matters of procedural fairness rather than the
substantive merits of the dispute. 171 The standard for review in
England-arbitrator "misconduct"-is arguably a bit vague.
Thus the context of the law's application will be more important
than the text of the statute itself. The French and Dutch laws
explicitly provide codified grounds for challenge of awards.
The UNCITRAL model law likewise strikes a balance
between arbitral autonomy on the merits of the dispute and judicial control of the arbitration's procedural fairness.1 72 Adopted
170. See supra note 166. However, in Thurgau, which has not yet adhered to the
Concordat, there is no provision for annulment of awards even in the case of a wildcard

arbitrator who exceeds his jurisdiction-although courts may "revise" (revision) or
"interpret" (erlduterung)awards. See section 221 of Thurgau Zivilprozess Ordnung (ZPO).
171. South of the Alps, the Italian reforms of 1983 did not affect the basic procedural

safeguards contained in article 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permits
annulment of an award that has "exceeded the limits of the submission." See translation by
Associazione Italiana per l'Arbitrato, 9 Y.B. COM. ARB.
National Report on Italian Arbitration Law, 8 Y.B. COM.
COM. ARB. 24 (1981).
172. See generally I. DoRE, ARBITRATION AND
UNCITRAL RULES: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS (1986).

309 (1984); see also Bernini,
ARB. 327 (1983), and 6 Y.B.
CONCILIATION UNDER THE
The new Canadian federal

legislation (which applies only to maritime matters and cases involving the federal
government or a federal government agency) reproduces almost verbatim the UNCITRAL
Model Law. See Commercial Arbitration Act, Act of June 17, 1986, 33-35 Eliz. II, ch. 22.
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on June 21, 1985 by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for consideration by national legislatures, the
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration gives parties freedom to choose their procedural arbitration rules within a
framework of mandatory grounds for review of awards inspired
by the New York Arbitration Convention.
Drawing the line between an arbitrator's excess of authority
and a mere mistake continues to be a source of potential uncertainty. Courts open a Pandora's box when they attempt to distinguish between an arbitrator's normally unreviewable legal
error when he renders a "bad award," and his deliberate or inadvertent refusal to apply the chosen law or otherwise to respect
the terms of his mission. Excess of authority and the related
concept manifest disregard of law, are slippery notions by which
courts deal with a fundamental discord between how the arbitra17 3
tor was authorized to decide and how he in fact did decide.
Defining the content of basic due process (or natural justice,
to use British terminology) likewise remains problematic. What
does it mean to guarantee each party an opportunity to be heard
and to present a case? For example, foreign fears of Americanstyle discovery may account for much of the reluctance to
choose New York as an arbitral situs. To the continental businessman, this American idiosyncracy will generally add unfamiliar complication rather than comfort. Thus courts in New York
will ordinarily deny requests for discovery in arbitration.1 74 But
basic aspects of the American adversarial process are preserved.
The right to cross-examine witnesses (on which the continental
and the Anglo-American approaches diverge), is deemed an
essential element to a fair hearing, and thus prevents arbitrators
from adopting an entirely inquisitorial system. 175
Finally, what substantive public policies justify annulling
awards? In countries such as France and Switzerland, which
In Quebec, some but not all aspects of the model were enacted in 1986. See Act of 11 Nov.
1986, amending Quebec Code de procidurecivile [QuE. C. PR. civ.] arts. 940-951 (1986).
See generally Kos-Rabeewicz-Zubkowski, Adaptation of UNCITRAL Model Law on
InternationalCommercialArbitration, 5 J. INT'L ARE., Sept. 1988, at 43.
173. See discussion of manifest disregard of the law, supra notes 25, 115, and
accompanying text.
174. See cases cited in Stein & Wotman, The ArbitrationHearing,in INTERNATIONAL
COMMEMRCIAL ARiBITRATION IN NEW YORK 86, 87-93 (J. McClendon & R. Goodman eds.
1986).
175. See N.Y. Arbitration Law § 7506(c) (McKinney 1980); Nestel v. Nestel, 38
A.D.2d 942, 942-43, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (App. Div. 1972).
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make violation of ordre public an explicit ground for annulling
awards, a distinction is rightly made between public policy
applicable to domestic arbitrations as opposed to international
ones. As illustrated by the recent Ninth Circuit case confirming
an award of allegedly illegal commissions for arms, even vital
American defense policies may be too ill-defined to be useful as a
guide to arbitrators. 176 And while many countries distinguish
parochial notions of national public policy from broader norms
applied to international transactions, agreement on specific
examples is not obvious.
V.

SUBJECT MATTER ARBITRABILITY AND JUDICIAL

REVIEW OF AWARDS

Judicial review of arbitration awards may at first blush
seem inconsistent with the trend toward expanding the arbitrator's authority to decide sensitive public-law claims involving
matters like antitrust and securities regulation. There is no reason, however, that the neutrality of procedure and forum offered
by arbitration cannot co-exist with limited court review of
awards. The increased scope of arbitrable subject matter may
even bring greater judicial sensitivity to the need to insure that
the public consequences of an award have been properly
addressed. Thus the Supreme Court suggested in Mitsubishithat
judges enforce agreements to arbitrate subject to a "second
look" on matters of public policy.177
In purely domestic disputes, a case can be made for denying
arbitrators the power to decide public law disputes. In international dispute resolution, however, the paramount importance of
insuring a neutral forum argues for enforcement of arbitration
clauses. The effectiveness of neutral cross-border arbitration
requires that arbitrators have the first word in deciding the contract's interpretation, even if judges have the last word on the
contract's vital public policy implications.
In large measure the health of arbitration depends on the
timing of court interference. To prevent an arbitrator from
interpreting the contract, or to require parallel proceedings for
public law issues, frustrates the parties' most fundamental expectations about the settlement of their differences. Having thought
176. See Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg., S.A., 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 261 (1987), discussed supra notes 113-15.
177. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985).
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he agreed to arbitrate before a neutral law professor in Paris or
London, the claimant instead finds the dispute decided in whole
or in part before a hostile judge in the defendant's country.
Whether in Boston or Barcelona, Atlanta or Algiers, Chicago or
Cairo, the other side's home town judge was not the bargainedfor adjudicator.
On the other hand, if courts delay intervention until the
award has been rendered, the agreement to arbitrate will have
been honored. Only if the arbitrator did in fact ignore vital
national interests of the relevant jurisdictions will judicial interference be necessary.
A.

Protecting the Public

American courts,, at one time or another in the past, have
considered many areas of business-related law to be too important to submit to arbitration: antitrust, the Securities Act, patents, ERISA claims at termination of employment, bankruptcy
matters for which there is an automatic stay of all actions, the
Commodities Exchanges Act, the Civil Rights Act, state
franchise statutes, and punitive damages. These "non-negotiable" legal rules are designed to create benefits for all of society.
Matters such as a fair stock market, free competition, and an
orderly way to deal with bankruptcies implicate what might be
called public rights. 178
The central theme in nonarbitrability cases is a concern that
society will be injured by arbitration of public law claims.
Courts express a fear that public law issues are too complicated
for arbitrators; that arbitration proceedings are too informal; or
that arbitrators are like foxes guarding the chicken coop, with a
pro-business bias that will lead to under-enforcement of laws
designed to protect the public. Lack of appeal on the merits of
arbitral awards in the United States makes arbitration seem to
some as a "black hole" to which rights are sent and never heard
from again.
Recently, there has been an erosion of judicial resistance to
arbitration of statutory claims, not only with respect to contracts
178. See, eg., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (the 1933 Securities Act);
Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1984) (the Commodities
Exchange Act); Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984) (bankruptcy matters for which there is an automatic stay of
all actions). See generally Park, PrivateAdjudicators,supra note 7.
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containing an international element, 179 but also in domestic controversies.1 80 As discussed below, the wisdom of this trend may
be questionable in domestic transactions, but justified when the
parties are of different nationalities.
B.

Justifying InternationalCommercialArbitration

Allowing an arbitrator to decide a public law claim,
although his award may be refused enforcement on grounds of
public policy, is not a perfect accommodation of the competing
claims for a neutral forum and for safeguarding the public interest. It does, however, respond to the special needs of international commerce by permitting the legal merits of the dispute to
pass through the strainer of neutral arbitration before judges
later review the award on the restricted grounds of what the Sechas called our "most basic notions of morality and
ond Circuit
8'
justice.'
179. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (Suit based on violations
of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1982), claiming
fraudulent representations on trademark rights that were part of an international sale.
Based on the need for certainty in international business, the Supreme Court held that
claims arising under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act were arbitrable in an international
setting.); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
629 (1985) (Dispute between Japanese car manufacturer and Puerto Rican dealer as a
result of the dealer's inability to sell pre-ordered cars. Antitrust violations presented in
counterclaim by dealer. The Supreme Court held antitrust claims arbitrable in
international context although a different result might be reached in a purely domestic
setting.); Socilt6 Nationale Algerienne (SONATRACH) v. Distrigas Corp., 80 Bankr. 606
(D. Mass. 1987) (contract for supply of liquified natural gas; arbitration ordered in Geneva
between Algerian state agency and American company in chapter 11 reorganization).
180. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987), and
commentary by Hoellering, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon: Broadened
Domain of Arbitration in the U.S.A., 4 J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1987, at 153. Customers
brought securities fraud and RICO claims against their broker for churning. Shearson
moved to compel arbitration in accordance with the brokerage agreement between the
parties. The Supreme Court held that both the securities claims and the RICO claims are
arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213 (1985), involved a suit alleging violatiops of both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and state law provisions. The Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act
mandated arbitration of all issues covered by an arbitration agreement, leaving no room for
discretion on the part of the district court because of "intertwining" of arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims. Id at 216-17. In an action in California to compel arbitration of
claims arising under the California Franchise Investment Law, the Supreme Court held
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state law and applied to state as well as federal
claims, concluding that claims arising under the California franchise law were arbitrable.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
181. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci6t6 Grnrrale de l'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting a public policy defense based on
break in diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Egypt). Recent American cases have
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International commercial arbitration provides a neutral
playing field on which transnational economic law is enforced.
Although it is difficult to generalize, the role of arbitration in the
process of global wealth creation normally is justified by neither
speed nor cost, but rather because its neutrality of forum and
delocalized procedure provide a means of avoiding the
"hometown justice" of the other party's judicial system."8 2
Arbitration also reduces the idiosyncracies of national procedural law in matters such as discovery, the rules of evidence, and
examining witnesses.
In a purely domestic context, an unenforceable arbitration
clause may result in a trial in New York rather than an arbitration in Boston. In an international dispute, the alternative judicial proceedings may be in a foreign language and before a
hostile judge of a country in which political influence makes a
fair trial problematic: not a variant of the language of Shakespeare used in the Big Apple, but the pure language of the
prophet Mohammed in Tripoli.
This special need for neutrality of forum led the Supreme
Court to allow a wider scope for subject matter arbitrability in
international arbitration than in domestic. Securities law 8 3 and
antitrust claims'1 4 were arbitrable in international disputes at a
construed the public policy defense narrowly in order to avoid disrupting the international
dispute resolution process. An arbitrator's lack of independence from one of the parties has
been held not to constitute a violation of public policy. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI
Management, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Participation in the Arab boycott
of Israel has been held not to give rise to a public policy defense. Antco Shipping Co. v.
Sidermar, 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Misleading the arbitral tribunal has been
found not to justify the public policy defense, although dicta in the same case states that
active fraud, such as pejury, might cause enforcement of the award to violate public
policy. Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraere GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument
Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.J. 1976). In only one published case, to my knowledge,
has an award been refused recognition under the catch-all public policy defense of the New
York Convention's article V(2)(b). This case involved what the court deemed a penal
provision of French law caliing for penalties for late payment for goods and must be viewed
as an aberration. Laminoirs - Trefileries - Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F.
Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980); see Park, Private Adjudicators, supra note 7, at 647. See
generally Coulson, So Far, So Good; Enforcement of Foreign Commercial Arbitration
Awards in United States Courts, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at 353.
182. Different considerations (principally arbitrator expertise) may lead to
agreements to arbitrate matters of fact (so-called "sniff & feel" arbitrations) or matters
arising out of standard form contracts in industries with historical ties to a particular
locality (e.g., insurance arbitration in London).
183. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 506.
184. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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time when they could not be submitted to arbitrators in a domestic controversy.
C. DistinguishingDomestic and InternationalTransactions
Enforcement of binding arbitration of sensitive public policy questions has less to recommend itself in a domestic context
than in an international one. 185 In domestic disputes, the need
for a politically neutral forum does not present a justification for
allowing private adjudication of public interests. However, even
if the recent trend toward arbitrability of public law claims in
domestic cases turns out to be a misguided experiment, 18 6 sound
reasons still exist for permitting arbitration of cross-border
disputes.
The protection of society against private adjudicators'
under-enforcement of law does not marry well with the needs of
international trade and investment for a system of neutral, nonnational, binding adjudication. Even if enforcement of a freely
accepted bargain to arbitrate will provide the business community with confidential, economical, and speedy dispute resolution, it may not protect the public against under-enforcement of
mandatory public norms. Arbitrators may be less likely than
courts to apply law correctly, and thus may hurt those segments
of society that have a stake in the outcome of the dispute.
Business managers, however, will be more likely to enter
into wealth-enhancing trans-border contracts if they feel confident that potential disputes will be settled by adjudication more
neutral than the home town justice of the other party's national
courts. The delineation of subjects that may or may not be submitted to an arbitrator thus involves a tension between rival policies. Each policy is sound and worthy of recognition by itself,
but they are in conflict with one another in their application.
For international disputes, the needs of international commerce would seem entitled to prevail. In transnational commercial contracts, the parties' differing nationalities are an obstacle
to their voluntary submission to mutually trusted courts. The
consequences of an unenforceable arbitration clause can be so
dramatically disagreeable in a trans-border transaction 8 7 that
185. See supra note 180.
186. See generally Brunet, Questioningthe Quality ofAlternate Dispute Resolution, 62
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Cf S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 50, at 2-7.

187. Imagine a Libyan enterprise contracting with a Massachusetts corporation
under an agreement that provided for arbitration of disputes in Paris under the
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the benefit of an arguably more correct application of law by a
judge must yield to the need for neutral forum.
It is one thing to say that the seat of the arbitration or the
loser's home country can review, and perhaps vacate, an award
that violates the country's basic public order. It is quite another
matter to say that a defendant should be able to move for a full
trial on the merits in his home court, merely by asserting a statutory counterclaim implicating a nonarbitrable subject matter.
Requiring businessmen to honor their agreements to arbitrate international contract disputes does not ignore domestically nurtured concerns for proper enforcement of public law
claims in a domestic context. There, the concern for proper
enforcement of vital public policies through court litigation
meets fewer competing concerns than when one party is foreign.
An international context, by contrast, presents an overriding
consideration. The need for a politically neutral forum, and a
procedurally neutral set of rules, compels concern for public law
claims to yield.
In essence, this need for neutrality impelled the Supreme
Court to find in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 188 that a parochial
refusal to enforce an international arbitration agreement would
frustrate the predictability of a forum selection clause. Such predictability, the Court wrote, is "an almost indispensable precondition to... any international business transaction." Absence of
predictable forum selection would lead to "a legal no man's-land
[that] would surely damage the fabric of international commerce
and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen
to enter into international commercial agreements." 189
A double standard for determining matters that may be
submitted to arbitration requires a test separating the goats from
the sheep, differentiating those international transactions that
call for a wider scope of arbitrable subject matter. Two definitional models of international arbitration have been adopted in
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules. When the contract became
onerous for the Libyan enterprise, a Libyan statutory claim was asserted before a Libyan
court, which refused on public policy grounds to give effect to the agreement to arbitrate.
The American company had expected that the dispute would be arbitrated in Paris rather
than litigated in Tripoli, just as the Libyans had expected arbitration in Paris rather than
litigation in Boston. The Americans will be distressed to see their expectations defeated by
assertions of Libyan public law. It would not be surprising if the Libyans reacted similarly
when the shoe was on the other foot.
188. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
189. Id. at 516-17.
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other contexts. A party-oriented test, looking to nationality and
residence of the litigants, has been favored in different forms by
Belgian, English, and Swiss statutes. A less mechanical model,
asking whether the arbitration implicates the interests of international commerce, has been adopted by the French. The United
States, in applying the New York Arbitration Convention, looks
to the parties' nationalities, excluding contracts between Americans from the Convention's scope unless there is a reasonable
relationship with a foreign country.
For purposes of determining the appropriate scope of arbitrability, a test focusing on the parties' nationalities would seem
best suited to meeting the goals of the double standard.190 When
contracting enterprises are based in the same country, the consequences of a failed arbitration clause are less dramatic even if
foreign commerce is implicated. The more flexible, interest-oriented approach of the Gallic model, however, might commend
itself in other contexts.
CONCLUSION

For better or for worse, nations are abandoning the Biblical
injunction to have one law for sojourners and natives alike. 191
Fewer national norms apply to arbitration of disputes involving
a foreign element than to controversies localized within the borders of a single country. International dispute resolution will
become more effective to the extent that the current trend
toward less interaction between judge and arbitrator at the place
of the proceedings reduces judicial meddling in the legal merits
of a dispute.
Not all national constraints, however, impede fair and efficient arbitration. Courts should encourage arbitrator fidelity to
the parties' expectations. Unless judges at the seat of the arbitration possess clearly defined power to correct fraud, arbitrator
excess of authority, and infringement of basic due process, the
loser may be required to defend against an unfair award everywhere in the world where it has assets. When the victim of procedural irregularities is the losing claimant, the results of arbitral
190. The author repents of his previous suggestion that the French model
commended itself for this purpose. See Park, PrivateAdjudicators, supra note 7, at 668.
The only justification to be offered for this metanoia is Emerson's counsel that "a foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."
191. See Exodus 12:49; Leviticus 24:22; Numbers 9:14. But note the anti-foreign
provisions in the usury rules of Deuteronomy 23:20.

706

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

autonomy are even more dramatically unfair. If denied the
opportunity to have the award set aside where rendered, the
unsuccessful claimant has no enforcement forum in which to
contest the defective award, for the simple reason that there is
nothing to enforce. The losing claimant's only recourse would
be to commence litigation and to deny the award's res judicata
effect-a solution hardly compatible with the bargain to resolve
disputes through arbitration rather than the courts.
Commercial arbitration is a consensual waiver of recourse
to the courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction. It differs
from the heteroclite forms of nonbinding conciliation now in
vogue, in that courts are expected to enforce the arbitrator's
decision. 192 Most legal systems support such renunciation of
judicial jurisdiction either by enforcing agreements and awards,
ordering attachments of assets to secure payment of awards, or
making defective arbitration clauses workable. However, the
support is granted only on the condition that mandatory procedural safeguards be available to protect against arbitrators who
exceed the limits of their mission or corrupt the arbitral process.
Indeed, national assistance to arbitration would seem to carry
with it an obligation to insure the integrity of the decisionmaking process.
One Lord Justice of Appeal in England has argued that
judicial review is a "bulwark against corruption, arbitrariness,
bias ...

and ... sheer incompetence, in relation to acts and

decisions with binding legal effect for others. No one having the
power to make legally binding decisions in this country
should
' 193
be altogether outside and immune from this system."
Some countries do not share the view that international
arbitration should benefit from a right to have an arbitrator's
excess of authority or fraud corrected where the award is rendered. In Belgium arbitral autonomy has been pushed so far as
to eliminate sanctions even against arbitrators who disregard the
will of the parties. 194 No effective local safeguard keeps proce192. See S.GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 50, at 91-147, 189-225;
L. KANOWITZ, supra note 50, at 39-111; S.LEESON & B. JOHNSTON, supra note 50, at 13362.
193. Sir Michael Kerr, Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law, 34
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 15 (1985).

194. See infra note 162; see also discussion of exclusion of review in Switzerland,
supra notes 165-70. Swedish courts seem to take an ambiguous position, refusing to take
jurisdiction over some actions by foreigners to have awards declared void (e.g., because the
arbitration agreement had lapsed before the arbitration), but not others (e.g., when the
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durally defective awards from assuming an international currency under the New York Convention.
Whether a national legal framework can be called favorable
to arbitration depends in large part on whether one adopts the
viewpoint of a potential winner or loser. The claimant with a
strong case will usually look for speed, economy, and finality.
The perspective of the potential loser is also understandable,
however. Fearing that his arguments are not self-evident, he will
look for judicial review to ensure that all aspects of the case have
been fairly considered. It would be misguided and irresponsible
to pursue the goals of speed and finality sought by winners at the
expense of the procedural fairness expected by losers.
The role of the arbitral situs is vital in supporting international commercial arbitration. Under the New York Convention, the place of the arbitration gives the arbitrator's decision a
presumptive validity in any of the countries that have ratified the
Convention.1 95 Therefore, freeing arbitration from all control
over its basic fairness at the place of proceedings may in its own
way prove as unfortunate as the opposite extreme of merits
review of awards.
From the business manager's perspective, what is called for
is assurance that the arbitration agreement and award will be
enforced, but with balanced court review: freedom from judicial
meddling with the dispute's legal merits, combined with judicial
procedures to insure that the arbitrator respected the limits of
his authority and basic due process. The arbitral seat should
concern itself with the bounds of the arbitrator's mission and the
fair play expected by the parties, but not with the correct interpretation of the contract or marginal procedural niceties.
To this end, international treaties might require enforcement of foreign arbitral awards only when rendered in countries
providing a nonwaivable right of review of awards for violation
of (1) the arbitrator's jurisdiction, both as to the parties and the
applicable law, (2) fundamental procedural fairness, including
the right to be heard and to present one's case, and (3) international public policy. Nations seeking to attract arbitration business would want local awards to benefit from treaty
ground for setting aside is the improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal). See
discussion of Republic of Uganda v. Solel Boneh Int'l (Stockholm Tingsratt, December 14,
1983), in Paulsson, supra note 59, at 146-47.
195. See discussion of Convention Articles III and V(1)(e), supra notes 121-27 and
accompanying text.
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enforcement, and thus would be encouraged to provide safeguards for the basic integrity of proceedings conducted within
their borders.
Keeping review within acceptable limits admittedly is not
easy to put into practice. There is no bright line nor intellectually satisfactory test to distinguish between an arbitrator who
exceeds his authority, and one who merely makes a mistake and
renders a bad award. In some cases an arbitrator may even be
justified in disregarding the parties' choice of law in favor of the
mandatory norms of the place of performance. But some measure of discernment is possible, and an awareness of the consequence of either too much or too little scrutiny of awards should
facilitate the process.
The elaboration of workable definitions of fundamental due
process will be similarly difficult. Through a long and perhaps
complex articulation of cohesive notions of fairness, parochial
peculiarities must be abandoned in favor of an international consensus on the essential elements"inhering in the right to effective
I
presentation of one's case.
Even more challenging will be the task of defining the common interests and values to be given effect in delimiting international, as contrasted to internal, public order. 196 Terms such as
"public policy" and "ordre public" are malleable, and represent
ill-defined concepts that risk lending themselves to court scrutiny on the merits of the award.
The winner of an arbitration will not usually warm to judicial review of an award in his favor. Review adds delay and
expense, and compromises the privacy that the parties expected
from arbitration. But the loser and the public are also affected
by the arbitration. Respect for their interests calls for some
measure of court scrutiny of awards at the place of the
proceedings.
Without some local court supervision of international commercial arbitration, the application of transnational norms may
turn arbitration into a businessman's nightmare worse than a
196. It may be easier to give examples of matters that violate both domestic and
international public policy (e.g., illegal arms deals, slavery, and traffic in illicit drugs) than
to speculate about consensus on those norms whose violation affronts a country's national
but not international public policy (e.g., exchange controls, antitrust, customs and tax
regulations). For illustrations of areas where such distinctions have been made, see Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), discussed supra note 179 (arbitrability of
antitrust disputes); and Judgment of June 9, 1983, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1983 REv. ARB.
497 (usury)).
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Texas jury: a dispute resolution system lacking the predictability necessary to permit informed decisions about the legal risks
of commercial choices. Neither the parties to the dispute nor the
public interests affected by the arbitration will be well served by
letting arbitration drift free of national legal constraints designed
to insure that arbitrators fulfill the shared expectations of those
who entrusted them with their mission.

